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FUNDING PUBLIC PENSION PLANS
JONATHAN BARRY FORMAN*

Most state and local government employees are covered by
traditional final-average-pay pension plans. State and local
government employers typically fund those pension plans through
a combination of employer and employee contributions, with help
from investment returns on already-accumulated assets. Unlike
private sector pension plans, however, public pension plans are not
subject to strict minimum funding standards like those in the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA").1
Public pensions also face more flexible accounting standards than
private sector pensions. 2 To be sure, many public pensions are
nevertheless fairly well funded. Unfortunately, however, the
recent meltdown of financial markets, the decline in the stock
market, and the recession are putting tremendous pressure on
both public pensions and the state and local governments that
fund them; and public employers need to respond.
At the outset, this Article reviews the operation and funding
status of state and local government pension plans. Next, this
Article discusses the major financial, accounting, and legal issues
that relate to the funding of state and local government pension
plans. Finally, this Article considers how to ensure that public
employees will have adequate retirement benefits now and in the
future.

* Copyright 2010 Jonathan Barry Forman. Alfred P. Murrah Professor of Law,
University of Oklahoma; B.A. 1973, Northwestern University; M.A.
(Psychology) 1975, University of Iowa; J.D. 1978, University of Michigan; M.A.
(Economics) 1983, George Washington University; Member of the Board of
Trustees of the Oklahoma Public Employees Retirement System; and
Professor in Residence at the Internal Revenue Service Office of Chief
Counsel, Washington, D.C., for the 2009-2010 academic year. Thanks to Beth
Almeida, Jeffrey R. Brown, William ("Flick") B. Fornia, James R. Lamenzo,
Ron Snell, and David W. Wilcox for their helpful comments.
1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406,
88 Stat. 829 (2006).
2. For purposes of this article, the term "public plans" refers only to state
and local government pension plans and does not include Social Security or

the federal government's civil service and military retirement plans.
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OPERATION AND FUNDING STATUS OF STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT PENSION PLANS

A. Overview of State and Local Government Pension Plans

There are fifty state governments and 87,525 local
governments in the United States. 3 Compensation of state and
local government employees is a large share of the cost of
providing services to citizens. Almost twenty million employees
and seven million retirees and dependents of state and local
governments have been promised pensions. 4 Over the next thirty
years, it has been estimated that states will spend around $2.35
5
trillion on pension benefits for their workers.
3. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO 08-317, STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS: GROWING FISCAL CHALLENGES WILL EMERGE DURING THE
NEXT 10 YEARS 6 (2008).
4. Barbara D. Bovbjerg, Dir. of Educ., Workforce, and Income Sec., State
and Local Government Pension Plans: Current Structure and Funded Status,
Testimony Before the Joint Economic Committee (July 10, 2008), in U.S.
GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO 08-983T, July 2008, at 1. According to the
Census Bureau, there were 2,547 state and local government employee
retirement systems in 2006-2007 covering 18,583,270 members (14,422,883
active and 4,160,387 inactive), and 7,463,567 beneficiaries were receiving
periodic benefit payments. U.S. Census Bureau, Table Five: Number and
Membership of State and Local Government Employee-Retirement Systems by
State: 2006-2007 (Dec. 9, 2008), http://www.census.gov/govs/retire/2007
ret05.html. For more details about state and local government employees, see
generally Joshua M. Franzel, The Public Sector Workforce - Past,Present, and
Future, CTR. FOR ST. AND LOCAL GOV'T EXCELLENCE, Jan. 5, 2009,
http://www.slge.org (search "Franzel," then click '"Te Public Sector Workforce
- Past, Present, and Future" hyperlink).
5. THE PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, PROMISES WITH A PRICE: PUBLIC
SECTOR RETIREMENT BENEFITS 3 (2008), available at http://www.pewcenter
onthestates.org/report detail.aspx?id=32626. The number is an estimate of
the total of the state's thirty-year obligations as calculated in 2006. Id. at 4
fig.1-1. Pertinent here, it is worth noting that state employees typically
contribute to their pensions. See infra note 13, at 1, 4 and accompanying text.
Also of note, public pensions play an important role in state and local
economies. See, e.g., ILANA BOIVIE & BETH ALMEIDA, NAT'L INST. ON RET.
SEC., PENSIONOMICS: MEASURING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF STATE AND
LOCAL PENSION PLANS 1 (2009), available at http:l/www.nirsonline.org/
storage/nirsdocuments/Pensionomics%20Report.pdf (finding that recipients of
pensions spend their income in the local economy); William Pryor, Chairman,
L.A. County Emp. Ret. Ass'n, The Economic Impact of Traditional Public
Pension Plans on the Communities They Serve, Testimony Before the Joint
Economic Committee, Hearing on Your Money, Your Future: Public Pension
Plans and the Need to Strengthen Retirement Security and Economic Growth
3-4 (July 10, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.jec.senate.gov/index.cfm
?FuseAction=Hearings.HearingsCalendar) (choose "July" and "2008" in the
"Browse by" dropdown box, then click "Your Money, Your Future: Public
Pension Plans and the Need to Strengthen Retirement Security and Economic
Growth" hyperlink) (noting the effects that pension plans have on the United
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State and local governments typically provide their employees
with a traditional defined benefit pension plan 6 and a
supplemental defined contribution plan 7 for additional, voluntary
savings.8
For example, the Oklahoma Public Employees
States economy); Christian E. Weller, Assoc. Prof., Univ. of Mass., and Senior
Fellow, Ctr. for Am. Progress, Model Retirement Savings: How Public Sector
Pension Plans Provide Adequate Retirement Savings in an Efficient and
Sustainable Way, Testimony Before the Joint Economic Committee, Hearing
on Your Money, Your Future: Public Pension Plans and the Need to
Strengthen Retirement Security and Economic Growth 8-9 (July 10, 2008)
(transcript available at http://www.jec.senate.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=
Hearings.HearingsCalendar) (choose "July" and "2008" in the "Browse by"
dropdown box, then click the 'Your Money, Your Future: Public Pension Plans
and the Need to Strengthen Retirement Security and Economic Growth"
hyperlink) (discussing the impacts of defined benefit pensions plans in the
public sector).
6. In a defined benefit plan, an employer promises employees a specific
benefit at retirement. JONATHAN B. FORMAN, MAKING AMERICA WORK 215
(2006). To provide that benefit, the employer typically makes payments into a
trust fund and makes withdrawals from the trust fund. Id.
Employer
contributions are based on actuarial valuations, and the employer bears all of
the investment risks and responsibilities. Id. Defined benefit plans often
provide each worker with a specific annual retirement benefit that is tied to
the worker's final average compensation and number of years of service. Id.
For example, a plan might provide that a worker's annual retirement benefit
is equal to 2%, times years of service, times final-average-compensation (B =
2% x yos x fac). Id. Under this final-average-pay formula, a worker with 30
years of service would receive a retirement benefit equal to 60% of her preretirement earnings (B = 60% x fac = 2% x 30 yos x fac). Id. Final-averagecompensation is typically computed by averaging the worker's salary over the
3 or 5 years prior to retirement. Id.
7. The typical supplemental defined contribution plan operates like an
I.R.C. § 401(k) plan in the private sector. See I.R.C. §§ 403(b), 457 (2009)
(explaining the deferred compensation plans of state and local governments).
Employees are permitted to contribute to individual investment accounts, and
their benefits at retirement are based on all such contributions plus
investment earnings. The maximum annual amount of such elective deferrals
that can be made by an individual in 2009 is $16,500, although workers over
the age of fifty can contribute up to $22,000. IRS.gov, IRS Announces Pension
Plan Limitations for 2009 (Oct. 16, 2008), http:// www.irs.gov/newsroom/article
/0,,id=187833,00.html.
8. As of 2007, most states had traditional final-average-pay defined
benefit plans. Bovbjerg, supra note 4, at 2. Only Alaska, Michigan, and the
District of Columbia had adopted defined contribution plans as their principal
pension plans; Indiana and Oregon had primary plans with both defined
benefit and defined contribution plan features, and Nebraska had a cash
balance defined benefit plan. Id. at 2-3; see also U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT.,
NATIONAL COMPENSATION SURVEY: RETIREMENT BENEFITS IN STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1-2 (2007) (presenting findings
regarding provisions of retirement plans in state and local governments); EMP.
BENEFIT RES. INST., FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS 489
(6th ed. 2009), availableat http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/books/fundam
entals/2009/48 DC-SuppPlnsPUB-SCTFunds-2009EBRI.pdf
(discussing
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Retirement System provides a traditional defined benefit pension
to covered workers. 9 At retirement, each worker receives an
annual retirement benefit equal to 2%, multiplied by years of
service, multiplied by final average pay. 10 For example, a worker
who retires after 30 years with final average pay of $50,000 would
receive a pension of $30,000 a year ($30,000 = 2% x 30 years of
service x $50,000 final average pay).1' In addition, Oklahoma
employees can elect to participate in a supplemental defined
contribution plan, known as SoonerSave.12
Unlike private sector pension plans, most governments
require employee contributions as well as employer (i.e.,
13
government) contributions to fund their primary pension plans.
In 2006, for example, the median contribution rate was 8.5% of
payroll for state and local government employers and 5% for
employees for plans in which employees are also covered by Social
Security.14 Pertinent here, while Social Security coverage is
nearly universal in the private sector, about 30% of all state and

defined contribution and supplemental retirement savings plans in the public
sector); NAT'L EDU. ASS'N, CHARACTERISTICS OF LARGE PUBLIC EDUCATION
PENSION PLANS 1 (2008) (discussing the retirement benefits provided to
education employees); WILLIAM FORD, Wisc. LEGIS. COUNCIL, 2006
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MAJOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 9,
15 (2007), available at http:// www.legis.state.wi.us/lc/publications/crs/2006_
retirement.pdf (examining contribution rates and vesting requirements); THE
CTR. FOR GOV'T ANALYSIS, AN ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT
SYSTEMS IN CALIFORNIA 5, 11 (2007), availableat http://www.govanalyst.coml
articles/pensionanalysis.pdf (discussing employee retirement systems in
California).
9. OKLA. PUB. EMP. RET. SYS., MEMBERS HANDBOOK, STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
4-5 (2007), available at http://www.opers.
ok.gov/Websites/opers/Images/pdfs/reg.book.07.pdf
[hereinafter
OPERS
HANDBOOK].
10. Id. at 44.
11. Id. Pertinent here, unlike most private sector defined benefit plans,
most government defined benefit plans provide postretirement cost-of-living
adjustments ("COLAs"). Bovbjerg, supra note 4, at 3; MILLIMAN, INC., STATE
OF OKLAHOMA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM:
ACTUARIAL
VALUATION REPORT AS OF JULY 1, 2008 1, 7 (2008), available at http://www.
(noting that the
opers.ok.gov/Websites/opers/Images/pdfs/OPEVAL08.pdf
Oklahoma legislature enacted a 4% COLA in 2008).
12. OPERS HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at 4-5.
13. See generally Alicia H. Munnell & Mauricio Soto, State and Local
PensionsAre Different from Private Plans, 2007 CTR. FOR RET. RES. at B.C. 1,
available at http://crr.bc.edu/briefs/stateandlocaLpensions-aredifferent_
from-privateplans.html.
14. Bovbjerg, supra note 4, at 4. For the fiscal year ending June 30, 2009,
Oklahoma public employees contributed 3.5% of their pay to the Oklahoma
Public Employees Retirement System, and state agencies contributed 15.5%.
Okla. Pub. Employees Ret. Sys., Contributions, http://www.opers.ok.gov/
contributions (last visited Sept. 26, 2009) [hereinafter Contributions].
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local government workers are not covered by Social Security;15 as
to those plans, the median contribution rates in 2006 were 11.5%
16
of payroll for employers and 8% for employees.
B. Funding Public Plans
Defined contribution plans, by their nature, are always fully
funded.17 On the other hand, defined benefit plans are often
underfunded. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the public
sector. While private sector defined benefit plans are subject to
strict minimum funding standards under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"),18 public sector
plans are not.19
Theoretically, state and local governments could simply pay
pension benefits to retirees on a pay-as-you-go basis. 20 Since the
15. Bovbjerg, supra note 4, at 3 n.5.
16. Id. at 4.
17. The employer's funding obligation is completed when the employer
makes the appropriate contributions to individual accounts, and subsequent
events have no impact on the employer's funding obligations. Pertinent here,
under a defined contribution plan, the employer's cost is known in advance
and can be included in the budget.
To be sure, some analysts wonder whether funding level is an
appropriate measure to use when comparing defined benefit plans and defined
contribution plans. U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO 08-8, PRIVATE
PENSIONS:
Low DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLAN SAVINGS MAY POSE
CHALLENGES TO RETIREMENT SECURITY, ESPECIALLY FOR MANY LOW-INCOME

WORKERS 12 (2007). Instead, it may be more useful to compare the extent to
which assets accumulated in defined contribution plans (and defined benefit
plans) are sufficient to meet retiree needs. On that measure, a recent study by
the Government Accountability Office found that defined contribution plans
were fairly "underfunded." See id. at 37 (explaining that a significant portion
of workers will not save a sufficient amount for a secure retirement).
18. ERISA § 302 (2009), 29 U.S.C. § 1082 (2006); I.R.C § 412 (2009). These
rules help ensure that the money needed to pay the promised benefits is set
aside in a trust fund where it can earn income until it is used to pay benefits
when the employee retires. In general, underfunded pension plans now have
to amortize their unfunded liabilities over seven years. ERISA § 303(c)(2), 29
U.S.C. § 1083(c)(2); I.R.C. § 430(c). Private-sector defined benefit plans are
also subject to the plan termination insurance program administered by the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation ("PBGC"). ERISA §§ 4001 et seq., 29
U.S.C. §§ 1301-11; Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., Pension Benefit Guaranty
Fact Sheet, http://www.pbgc.gov/media/key-resources-for-the-press/content/
page13542.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2009). In the event an underfunded
plan terminates (for example, because the employer went out of business), the
PBGC guarantees payment of pension benefits to the participants, up to
$54,000 per participant in 2009. Id. The guarantee is lower for those who
retire early or when there is a benefit for a survivor. Id. The guarantee is
increased for those who retire after age 65. Id.
19. ERISA § 4(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1).
20. That is practically what private employers and governments have done
with respect to their promises to provide health care benefits to retirees. In
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1980s, however, the Government Accounting Standards Board
("GASB") has provided general standards for accounting and
financial reporting that most state and local government plans
follow. 21 Under those accounting standards, state and local
governments are generally expected to prefund their pension plans
and to issue reports that disclose information about plan assets,
liabilities, funding status, and the assumptions used by the plan
actuary. 22 Nevertheless, while both private sector and public
sector plans strive to be 100% funded, many public sector experts
23
seem content when public plans are at least 80% funded.
that regard, when the Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB") issued
guidance requiring private employers to recognize those retiree health
liabilities on their financial statements, many of those employers reduced or
eliminated those benefits. See, e.g., PAUL FRONSTIN, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST.,
RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS: TRENDS AND OUTLOOK 3 (2001), available at
http://www.ebri.org/pdfbriefspdf/0801ib.pdf (noting the impact of Financial
Accounting Standard No. 106).
Similarly, recent guidance from the
Government Accounting Standards Board ('GASB") is likely to lead state and
local governments to either abandon or prefund their retiree health
obligations. See, e.g., John Sanchez, The Vesting, Modification, and Financing
of Public Retiree Health Benefits in Light of New Accounting Rules, 41 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 1147, 1161-63 (2008) (establishing that the new GASB
accounting standard will insist that state and local governments compile data
about their retiree health benefits, which may lead to public employers setting
aside funds, or prefunding); Joshua M. Franzel, Local Government Retiree
Health Care: Current Offerings and Future Direction, 25 J. OF COMP. AND
BENEFITS 1, 5, 9 (2009) (stating that due to the reluctance of local
governments to raise taxes, they are instead adopting other strategies to
reduce postemployment benefit liability); William R. Voorhees, Counting
Retirement Expenditures Before They Hatch: GASB and the New Reporting
Requirements for Other Postemployment Benefits, 25 PUB.BUDGETING & FIN.
4, 59, 68 (2005) (noting the possibility that a large number of governments will
alter their retiree healthcare benefits to minimize their liability from other
postemployment benefits); Standard & Poor's, U.S. States Are Quantifying
OPEB Liabilities and Developing Funding Strategies as the GASB Deadline
Nears, STANDARD & POOR'S RATINGS DIRECT, Nov. 12, 2007, at 2-3, available
at http://www.nasra.orgtresources/medicalSandPOPE B0711.pdf (noting that
the focus on states is now on their ability to maintain current benefit levels
and avoid liability for other postemployment benefits).
The federal
government also runs the Social Security system mostly on a pay-as-you-go
basis. FORMAN, supra note 6, at 190-91.
21. See generally Gov't Acct. Standards Bd., Summary of Statement No. 25:
Financial Reporting for Defined Benefit Pension Plans and Note Disclosures
for
Defined
Contribution
Plans
(Nov.
1994),
http://www.gasb.
org/st/summary/gstsm25.html [hereinafter Statement No. 25]; Gov't Acct.
Standards Bd., Summary of Statement No. 27: Accounting for Pensions by
State and Local Government Employees (Nov. 1994), http://www.gasb.orgst
/summary/gstsm27.html [hereinafter Statement No. 27].
22. Statement No. 25, supra note 21; Statement No. 27, supra note 21.
23. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO 07-1156, STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT RETIREE BENEFITS: CURRENT STATUS OF BENEFIT STRUCTURES,
PROTECTIONS, AND FISCAL OUTLOOK FOR FUNDING FUTURE COSTS 30 (2007)
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1. An Overview of Public Pension PlanFunding
Traditional defined benefit plans promise to pay pension
benefits for years and even decades into the future. Employees
typically earn benefit entitlements each year that they work, and
they typically receive pension benefits from retirement until
death. The challenge is to design a pension system that saves
enough resources while employees are working to pay them
benefits after they retire.
Public pension plans receive contributions from employers
and employees, invest those contributions, and eventually pay out
the promised retirement benefits. Plans rely on actuaries to tell
them how much they need to contribute today in order to meet
their pension benefit obligations in the future. More specifically, a
plan actuary estimates the plan's future liabilities to its retirees,
discounts those liabilities to present value, allocates a portion of
those liabilities to the past, and compares those liabilities to the
actuarial value of the plan's assets. The actuarial value of assets
is often based on a five-year moving average of expected actuarial
values and market values. 24 The excess of the plan's actuarial
accrued liabilities over the actuarial value of its assets is known as
'25
its "unfunded actuarial accrued liability" or "unfunded liability.
In making these projections about future liabilities and assets, the
actuary needs to make assumptions about an array of future
variables, including the interest rate, the investment rate, and
work force experience (e.g., terminations, deaths, disabilities, wage
26
growth, length of service, age of retirement, and life expectancy).
For example, consider the recent 2008 annual report of the
Oklahoma Public Employees Retirement System ("OPERS"). (See
Table 1). According to the actuarial section of that report, on June
30, 2008, OPERS had a total actuarial accrued liability of $8.9
billion and an actuarial value of assets of $6.5 billion, leaving it
with an unfunded actuarial accrued liability ("UAAL") of $2.4
billion. 27 Dividing $6.5 billion by $8.9 billion yielded a funded

ratio of

73%.

2

8

A variety of actuarial assumptions were used to

compute these valuations, including an investment return rate of
[hereinafter FUNDING FUTURE COSTS].
24. See, e.g., OKLA. PUB. EMPLOYEES RET. SYS., OKLAHOMA PUBLIC
EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE

FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2008 64 (2008), available at http://www.
opers.ok.gov/publications [hereinafter OKLA. RET. SYS. REP.].
25. Id. at 61, 63-64.
26. Id. at 64-65.
27. Id. at 63-64 (noting that the market value of assets as of June 30, 2008,
was just $6.255 billion and the actuarial value of assets, $6.492 billion, was
based on a five-year moving average of expected actuarial values and market
values).
28. Id. at 63.
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7.5% per year, an inflation assumption of 3.0% per year, and a
wage growth assumption of 4.25% per year; benefits were assumed
to increase 2% a year due to future ad hoc cost-of-living
29
increases.
Table 1.30 Oklahoma Public Employees Retirement System,
Actuarial Valuation, June 30, 2008
1. Participant Data
Number of
Active Members
Retired and Disabled Members and Beneficiaries
Inactive Members
Total Members
Projected Annual Salaries of Members
Annual Retirement Payments for Retired Members
and Beneficiaries
2. Assets and Liabilities
Total Actuarial Accrued Liability
Market Value of Assets
Actuarial Value of Assets
Unfunded Actuarial Accrued Liability
Funded Ratio
3. Employer Contribution Rates as a Percent of
Payroll
Normal Cost Rate
Amortization of Unfunded Actuarial Accrued Liability
Budgeted Expenses
Actuarial Required Contribution Rate
Less Estimated Member Contribution Rate
Employer Actuarial Required Contribution Rate
Less Statutory State Employer Contribution Rate
Contribution Shortfall

45,120
26,033
5,580
76,733
$1,682,663,413
$ 376,147,494

$8,894,287,254
$6,255,207,565
$6,491,928,362
$2,402,358,892
73.0%

12.46%
10.13%
0.39%
22.98%
4.04%
18.94%
14.50%
4.44%

The GASB also allows public pensions to use different
"actuarial cost!' methods, and OPERS uses the so-called individual
entry-age normal actuarial cost method of valuation to determine
its actuarial accrued liability and normal cost.3 1 Under the entryage normal cost method, the normal cost is calculated to produce a
level cost over each employee's career (i.e., a level percentage of
payroll). 32 The normal cost generally represents the expected cost

29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 64.
Id. at 61, 63.
Id. at 64.
Id.
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of projected benefits attributable to work performed and pension
benefits earned in the current plan year. The actuary for OPERS
estimated that the normal cost rate was 12.46% of covered
wages. 33 However, because additional contributions should be
made to amortize the plan's unfunded actuarial accrued liability,
the actuary reports that the actuarial required contribution
("ARC") rate was 22.98% of covered wages-4.44% more than
34
projected contributions based on current Oklahoma law.
In sum, the OPERS balance sheet in Table 1 highlights the
three key measures used to measure a pension plan's funded
status: unfunded liabilities, funded ratios, and contributions. 35 As
of June 30, 2008, OPERS had an unfunded liability of $2.4 billion,
a funded ratio of 73.0%, and a contribution shortfall of 4.44% of
covered wages. 36 Governments use reports like this to help them
decide about contribution levels, and plans use them to help
determine their investment strategies.
2. Investment Strategies
The GASB directs plan sponsors to articulate a combination
of contributions and investment returns on their existing assets
37
that will lead to the plan being fully funded within 30 years.
Contributions are often fixed by statute. For example, Oklahoma
law currently requires employees to contribute 3.5% of their pay to
the system, and state agencies currently contribute 15.5% of
38
payroll.
Asset allocation is the key determinant of the rate of return
on the plan's assets. In that regard, plans can virtually guarantee
a modest real return if they invest entirely in Treasury Bonds.
Plans that need to achieve a higher rate of return can usually
raise their expected rate of return by investing more in higheryielding, but riskier, investments like stocks and real estate. In
that regard, Table 2 shows some recent estimates of the rates of
return that can be expected from various classes of investment
assets.

33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 63.
Id.
Id. at 63.
Id.

37.

See, e.g., Alicia H. Munnell, Jean-Pierre Aubry & Dan Muldoon, The

Financial Crisis and State/Local Defined Benefit Plans, 2008 CTR. FOR RET.
RES. at B.C. 8-19, 5, available at http://crr.bc.edu/imageststories/Briefs/ ib_819.pdf (noting that 40 years was previously thought to be an acceptable
amortization period).
38. See Contributions, supra note 14 (reflecting mandated employer
contributions for fiscal year ending June 30, 2009).
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Table 2. 39 Asset Class Assumptions
Expected Return
Risk
U.S. Equity
8.50%
16.0%
Non-U.S. Equity
8.50%
17.0%
Private Equity
11.55%
26.0%
Real Estate
7.00%
15.0%
U.S. Bonds
4.00%
5.0%
Non-U.S. Bonds
3,75%
10.0%
Because most public plans want to earn a rate of return
higher than what they could earn by investing in U.S. Treasury
Bonds alone, public plans usually invest in a mix of stocks, bonds,
and other assets. 40 For example, to achieve the 7.5% expected rate
of return assumed by the actuary for the Oklahoma Public
Employees Retirement System, OPERS invests in a mix of U.S.
equity, non-U.S. equity, and U.S. bonds, as shown in Table 3.
OPERS periodically rebalances its portfolio when, because of
market fluctuations, the plan's actual asset allocation gets out of
41
line with its targeted allocation.
Table 3.42
Asset Allocation of the Oklahoma Public
Employees Retirement System (OPERS), June 30, 2008
Actual Allocation
U.S. Equity
Non-U.S. Equity
U.S. Bonds
Non-U.S. Bonds

38.6%
37.8%
23.2%
0.4%

Low

Target

High

37.3%
31.9%
21.0%
0.0%

40.0%
36.0%
24.0%
0.0%

42.7%
40.1%
27.0%
0.0%

39. WILSHIRE CONSULTING, 2009 WILSHIRE REPORT ON STATE RETIREMENT
SYSTEMS: FUNDING LEVELS AND ASSET ALLOCATION 12, Exhibit 14 (2009),

available at http://www.wilshire.com/BusinessUnits/Consulting/Investment/
2009_StateRetirementFundingReport.pdf#13.
40.

Pension plans try to use sound investment practices to invest their

assets in accordance with the actuarial needs of the plan. The typical pension
plan in the United States uses modern portfolio theory to choose a mix of
stocks, bonds, and other investments that balances risks and investment
returns, somewhere on the so-called "efficient frontier." Plans that need
higher rates of return tend to invest more heavily in stocks, but they face
greater volatility. On the other hand, plans that want less volatility invest
more heavily in bonds, consequently tolerating the generally lower rates of
return that comes with those conservative investments.
Fiduciary standards also tend to require pension plans to diversify and
invest prudently to secure higher rates of return. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), (C),
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B), (a)(1)(C). Although ERISA does not apply to public
plans, its fiduciary standards are often the model for all pension plans.
ERISA § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1).
41. See OKLA. RET. SYS. REP., supra note 24, at 49.
42. Id.
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Similarly, Figure 1 shows the average asset allocation for 125
state retirement systems that were recently analyzed by Wilshire
Consulting. 43 Table 4 shows that state pension plans have
recently shifted their assets away from bonds and towards more
aggressive investments in non-U.S. equity, real estate, and private
equity. Of note, the average rate of return for state and local
44
government plans from 1994 to 2004 was 9.3% per year.
Figure 1. 4 5
Plans

Average Asset Allocation for State Pension

Real
Estate,
Private
Eiat 5.6%
5.6 0o
Equity,

Non-U.S.
Bonds,l 0.9%

43. See also ILANA BOIVIE & BETH ALMEIDA, NAT'L INST. ON RET. SAV.,
PATIENCE IS A VIRTUE: ASSET ALLOCATION PATTERNS IN DB AND DC PLANS 2
http://www.nvpers.org/public/documentationlPatience%20is%20a%20
(2008),
Virtue.pdf (comparing the allocation of funds in public pension plans to the
allocation of funds in private defined public and defined contribution plans);
Youngkyun Park, Public Pension Plan Asset Allocations, 30 EMP. BENEFIT
RES. INST. NOTES 4, 2, 5 (2009), availableat http://www.ebri.org/pdffnotespdf/
ebrinotes_04-apr09.pblcpnsplnsl.pdf (discussing further asset allocation in
public pensions).
44. Alicia H. Munnell, Kelley Haverstick, Mauricio Soto & Jean-Pierre
Aubry, What Do We Know About the Universe of State and Local Plans?, 2008
CTR. FOR RET. RES. at B.C. 4, 4 (2008), available at http://
crr.bc.edu/briefs/what-do-we-knowabout-the-universe-of-stateand-local-pl
ans_.html.
45. WILSHIRE CONSULTING, supranote 39, at 11, Exhibit 12.
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Table 4.46 Asset Allocation for 125 State Pension Plans (in
percentages)
2003

2008

Change

US Equity
Non-US Equity
Real Estate
Private Equity
Equity Subtotal
Debt

42.3
12.9
4.0
4.2
63.4

38.1
18.8
5.9
5.6
68.4

-4.2
5.9
1.9
1.4
5.0

US Bonds
Non-US Bonds
Other
Debt Subtotal
Return
Risk

35.2
1.4
0.0
36.6
7.3
10.3

26.7
0.9
4.0
31.6
7.5
10.9

-8.5
-0.5
4.0
-5.0
0.2
0.6

Equity

3.

The Funding Levels of Public Pension PlansBefore the
Current Economic Recession

The actuarial assumptions, methods, amortization periods,
and smoothing periods vary from plan to plan. Consequently, the
funding status of different public plans cannot be easily
compared. 47
Moreover, as more fully discussed below, the
assumptions and accounting methods used by public plans are also
quite different from those used by private sector defined benefit
plans subject to ERISA. 48 With these caveats in mind, it is
nevertheless worthwhile to attempt to understand the funding
status of state and local government pension plans.
According to the National Association of State Retirement
Administrators, over three-fifths of the largest state and local
pension plans were at least 80% funded in 2007-a level that
many public plan experts say is enough to be "healthy."49 Of
course, funding levels varied dramatically across the 126 plans
surveyed-from about 32% to 113%.50 Also of concern, "the
46.
47.

Id. at 11, Exhibit 13.
Bovbjerg, supra note 4, at 6-7.

48. Infra Part II.B.
49.

FUNDING FUTURE COSTS, supranote 23, at 30.

50. Id.; see also Alicia H. Munnell, Kelley Haverstick & Jean-Pierre Aubry,
Why Does Funding Status Vary Among State and Local Plans?, 2008 CTR. FOR
RET. RES. at B.C. 6, 2 (2008), available at http://crr.bc.edu/images/
stories/Briefsslp_6.pdf?phpmyadmin=43ac483c4de9t5ld9eb41 (detailing the
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percentage of plans with a funded ratio of 80% or better has
decreased since 2000."51
According to a U.S. Government Accountability Office study
of state and local pension plans that was completed before the
stock market's recent troubles, state and local governments have
arguably been doing an adequate job funding their pensions. 52 In
that regard, Table 5 shows the level of contributions that the
Government Accountability Office said was needed to fully fund
state and local pensions at various rates of return on pension
assets. On average, state and local governments contributed
about 9% of wages to pension funds in 2006, and they could have
fully funded their pensions that year by increasing their
contributions slightly-to 9.3% of wages per year.5 3 Historically,
most public plans have earned fairly high rates of return on their
assets. Of course, if future rates of return are lower, then higher
54
contribution rates will be needed.

range in the funded ratio of state and local plans in 2006).
51.
U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO 08-223, STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT RETIREE BENEFITS: CURRENT FUNDED STATUS OF PENSION AND
HEALTH BENEFITS 15-16 (2008).
52. Bovbjerg, supra note 4, at 24; see also Alicia H. Munnell, Kelley
Haverstick, Steven A. Sass & Jean-Pierre Aubry, The Miracle of Funding by
State and Local Pension Plans, 2008 CTR. FOR RET. RES. at B.C. 5, 5, available
at http://crr.bc.edu/images/stories/Briefs/slp-5.pdf?phpMyAdmin=43ac483c4de
9t51d9eb41 (stating that the funding levels in both private and public sectors
were higher before the recent economic downturn).
GROWING FISCAL
53. See also STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS:
CHALLENGES WILL EMERGE DURING THE NEXT 10 YEARS, supra note 3, at 49
(finding that state and local government contributions would only need to
increase a half-percent in order to fully fund pensions).
54. See generally David G. Hitchcoke & Robin Prunty, Public Finance:
How "Smoothing" Can Ease the Pain of Pension Fund Losses for State and
Local Governments, STANDARD & POOR'S RATINGS DIRECT, Jan. 27, 2009; see
also Munnell, Aubry & Muldoon, supra note 37, at 6 (predicting increased
contributions if equities remain at depreciated values for the next 5 years);
TED HAMPTON & IDA CHAN, MOODY'S INVESTOR SERV., PENSION FUNDING MAY
SUFFER FROM 2008 STOCK MARKET DECLINES 3 (2008) (speculating that states
and municipalities may have to issue pension obligation bonds as a result of
the downturn), NAT'L ASSOC. OF ST. RET. ADMINISTRATORS AND NAT'L
COUNCIL ON TCHR. RET., NASRA/NCTR ISSUE BRIEF: MARKET DECLINES AND
PUBLIC PENSIONS 3 (2008), available at http://www.nasra.org/resources/
NASRANCTRISSUEBRIEF0812.pdf (predicting higher contributions from
both taxpayers and public employees).
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Table 5.55
Government Contributions Needed
Fund State & Local Pension Benefits, 2006
Simulation
assumption for
the rate of return
on investment
Higher return
scenario: 6% real
rate of return
Base case: 5%
real rate of
return
Lower-return
scenario: 4% real
rate of return
Risk-free
scenario: 3% real
rate of return

Projectedgovernment
contributionlevel needed
to fully fund the liability
5.0% of salaries per year
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to Fully

Difference between
projected contribution
level and the actual
9.0% of salaries
- 4.0% of salaries per
year

9.3% of salaries per year

+ 0.3% of salaries per
year

13.9% of salaries per
year

+ 4.9% of salaries per
year

18.6% of salaries per
year

+ 9.6% of salaries per
year

Before the recent downturn, local government plans also
seemed to be pretty well funded. For example, a recent study of
104 city and county retirement systems found that their average
funded ratio was 98% in 2007.56
4.

Current FundingLevels

Extraordinary declines in U.S. and worldwide stock markets
in 2007 and 2008 have meant huge investment losses for most
investors. For example, the Standard & Poor's 500 index fell by
57
38.49% in 2008.
Public pensions have shared in those investment losses.
According to one estimate, the median investment return for
public pension funds was a negative 24.91% in 2008. 5 8 Similarly,
FUNDING FUTURE COSTS, supranote 23, at 28.
WILSHIRE
CONSULTING, 2008 REPORT ON CITY AND COUNTY
RETIREMENT SYSTEMS: FUNDING LEVELS AND ASSET ALLOCATION 1 (2009)

55.

56.

[hereinafter WILSHIRE CONSULTING, 2008 REPORT]; see also Alicia H. Munnell,
Jean-Pierre Aubry & Kelly Haverstick, The Funding Status of Locally
Administered Pension Plans, 2008 CTR. FOR RET. RES. at B.C. 1-2, 8, available
at http://crr.bc.edulbriefstthe-funding-statusoflocally-administere d-pensio
n.plans 4.html (finding that, in a survey of 84 plans from 38 states, state
public pension plans' funded ratios averaged 86% and local plans' funded
ratios averaged 90%).
57. HOWARD SILVERBLATT, STANDARD & POOR'S, MONTHLY REPORT:
WORLD BY NUMBERS: DECEMBER 2008 3 (2009), available at http://www2
.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/index/123108_WorldbyNumbers-Report.pdf.
58. Standard & Poor's, Market Declines Will Shake Up U.S. State Pension
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the aggregate market value of state and local government pension
funds dropped from $3.2 trillion in 2006 to just $2.3 trillion as of
October 31, 2008. 59 Also, according to Wilshire Consulting's 2009
report on state retirement systems, the funded ratio for the 59
state retirement systems that reported actuarial data for 2008
dropped from 88% in 2007 to 77% in 2008.60
As in past market downturns, most observers expect that
public pension plans will continue to invest prudently. 6 1 Their
investment losses will have to be made up with additional
contributions from employers, employees, or both; however,
because of the relatively long duration of their pension liabilities
and because they use actuarially smoothed asset values rather
than market values, public plans can phase in their corrections
over a number of years. 62 In general, public pensions try to have
Fund Stability, STANDARD & POOR'S RATINGS DIRECT, Feb. 26, 2009, at 2,
available at http://www.nasra.org/resources/S&P0903.pdf.
59. NASRA/NCTR ISSUE BRIEF: MARKET DECLINES AND PUBLIC PENSIONS,
supra note 54, at 3; see also U.S. Census Bureau, Cash and Security Holdings
of Major Public Employee Retirement Systems: Quarter Ending June 30,
2009, and Prior Periods, tbl. 1 (Oct. 29, 2009), http://ftp2.census.gov/govs/qpr/
tablel.txt (displaying the cash and security holdings of major public employee
retirement systems); Munnell, Aubry & Muldoon, supra note 37, at 2 (noting
that equities declined by 42% from October 9, 2007, to October 9, 2008, and
estimating that state and local government plans lost $1.0 trillion of value);
Jack VanDerhei, The Impact of the Recent Financial Crisis on 401(k) Account
Balances, 2009 EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. ISSUE BRIEF 326, 1 (noting that
"major U.S. equity indexes were sharply negative, with the S&P 500 Index
losing 37.0 percent for the year, which translated into corresponding losses in
401(k) retirement plan assets"); Michael Barry, Market Forces: Pension Policy,
Market Thrmoil, and the Post-October 2008 World, PLAN SPONSOR, Mar. 2009,
available at http://www.plansponsor.comlmagazine type3_print.jsp?RECOR
D_D=44552 (discussing modern pension policies in light of the recent market
troubles); Barry Kozak, The Funding of Public Sector Pension Plans: Are They
Truly in Crisis Mode?, 2008 BENEFITS L. J. 21, 32-37 (2008) (weighing in on
the true status of public sector pensions); see generally MOODY'S GLOBAL
CREDIT RES., PENSION FUNDING MAY SUFFER FROM 2008 STOCK MARKET
DECLINES (2008).
60. WILSHIRE CONSULTING, supra note 39, at 1. Wilshire estimates that
the funded ratio for all 125 plans was 84% in 2008, down from 96% in 2007.
Id.
61. NASRA/NCTR ISSUE BRIEF: MARKET DECLINES AND PUBLIC PENSIONS,
supra note 54, at 3-4; CHRISTIAN E. WELLER & JEFFREY WENGER, NAT'L INST.
ON RET. SEC., IN IT FOR THE LONG HAUL: THE INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR OF
PUBLIC PENSIONS 1, 7 (2008), available at http://www.nirsonline.orgstorage/
nirs/documents/In%20it%20for%20the%2Long%/o2OHaul.pdf;
Christian
E.
Weller & Jeffrey B. Wenger, PrudentInvestors: The Asset Allocation of Public
Pension Plans 1, 3-4 (Univ. of Mass. Pol. Econ. Res. Inst., Working Paper No.
175, 2008), available at http://www.peri.umass.edu/236/hash/99f4915c13/publi
cation/314.
62. See, e.g., Munnell, Aubry & Muldoon, supra note 37, at 4 (predicting
the extent to which public pensions will be funded in the upcoming years).
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"contribution rates that remain relatively level as a percentage of
63
employer payroll from generation to generation of taxpayers."
Still, it seems likely that contributions will have to increase in
64
coming years.
II.

MAJOR FINANCIAL, ACCOUNTING, AND LEGAL ISSUES
RELATED TO FUNDING

A. FinancialPressureson Public Plans
1. Fiscal Pressureson State and Local Governments
According to the Government Accountability Office, state and
local governments will face operating deficits of about $131 billion
for 2009 and about $181 billion for 2010 unless they make
substantial policy changes. 65 Even larger fiscal challenges are
expected to emerge within a decade. 66 That is, absent any change
in their policies, state and local governments will face a growing
gap between their receipts and their expenditures in the coming
decades. 67 The biggest driver of this wedge between receipts and
expenditures is the growing cost of health care for employees,
retirees, and Medicaid recipients. 68 State and local governments
The

authors estimate that under pessimistic assumptions, public plans will be
around 59% funded in 5 years, while under optimistic assumptions they
should be 75% funded. Id. at 6.
63. NASRA/NCTR ISSUE BRIEF: MARKET DECLINES AND PUBLIC PENSIONS,
supra note 54, at 5.
64. See, e.g., Marlene Prost, Underfunded Public Pensions?, HUM. RES.
EXEC. ONLINE, Dec. 17, 2008, http://www.hreonline.com/HRE/story.jsp?story
Id=156523274 (forecasting a rise in pension contributions in the years to
come); Knowledge@Wharton, Not So Golden: Employees - and Employers Feel the Pinch from Shortfalls in Retirement Funding, Apr. 1, 2009, available
at http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2193 (explaining
the respective effects of the financial crisis on employees and employers);
Katie Benner, The Public Pension Bomb, FORTUNE, May 12, 2009, available at
http://money.cnn.com/2009/05/12/news/economy/benner-pension.fortune
(predicting a rise in public pension funding); Rich Connell, L.A.'s Biggest
Pensioner Is Also Its Harbingerof Doom, L.A. TIMES, May 21, 2009, available
at http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-parks-pension21-2009may21,0,
7737972.story (using one of L.A.'s largest pensions as a model of risk in
pension systems in the near future).
65. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO 09-320R, UPDATE OF STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FISCAL PRESSURES 2-3 (2009), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09320r.pdf.
66. STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS:
GROWING FISCAL CHALLENGES
WILL EMERGE DURING THE NEXT 10 YEARS, supra note 3, at 1.
67. Id. at 5.
68. Id. at 1. The Government Accountability Office estimates that over the
next 30 years, Medicaid expenditures will grow 1 percentage point faster than
the growth in gross domestic product per capita, and that employee and
retiree health expenditures will grow by as much as 1.4 percentage points
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will also need to increase their pension contributions in order to
fully fund pension costs for their employees. 69
The recent
recession has only magnified the fiscal pressures on state and local
governments. 70
In particular, state and local government
revenues have declined and will not recover until long after the
71
recession is over.
2. DemographicPressures
Another pressure on public pensions results from the fact that
Americans are living longer but retiring earlier. At the outset,
Table 6 shows that the life expectancy for a male born in 2008 was
75.4 years, up from just 61.4 years in 1940, and the average life
expectancy for a 65-year-old male in 2008 was 16.9 years, up from
just 11.9 years in 1940. Figure 2 shows greater detail about how
life expectancies for men have changed at various ages from 1900
72
until 2100; women have shown a similar improvement.

faster than GDP per capita. Id. at 18; see also Franzel, supra note 20, at 6
(explaining that the rising cost of health care will pose a significant "fiscal
challenge" to state and local governments).
69. In that regard, the bond ratings agencies are beginning to exert
significant pressure on states by downgrading the bonds of those states that
have significant long-term pension and benefit liabilities. See, e.g., James P.
Miller, S & P Downgrades Illinois' GO Bond Ratings, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 10,
2009, available at http://archives.chicagotribune.com2009/mar/10/business/
chi-illlinois-bond-rating-marlO (discussing, generally, the status of Illinois'
bond rating).
70. See, e.g., Nicholas Johnson, Phil Oliff & Jeremy Koulish, An Update on
State Budget Cuts: At Least 34 States Have Imposed Cuts that Hurt
Vulnerable Residents, but the FederalRecovery Package Is Reducing the Harm,
CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL'Y PRIORITIES, Oct. 12, 2009, at 1 (2009), available at

http://www.cbpp.orgfles/3-13-08sfp.pdf (detailing budget cuts on the national
level and the subsequent effect of the Federal Recovery Package).
71. See, e.g., Girard Miller, Outlook for Retirement Plan Investments,
GOVERNING, Jan. 22, 2009, available at http://www.governing.com/articles/
0901gmillerd.htm.
72. Life expectancy also varies by socioeconomic factors, such as race and
educational level. See, e.g., Joyce Manchester & Julie Topoleski, Growing
Disparitiesin Life Expectancy, CONG. BUDGET OFF., Apr. 17, 2008, at 1-2.
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Table 6. 73 Life Expectancy for Men and Women, 1940-2080
Life expectancy at birth
Male
Female

Life expectancy at age 65
Male
Female

1940

61.4

65.7

11.9

13.4

1960
1980
2000
2008

66.7
69.9
74.0
75.4

73.2
77.5
79.4
80.0

12.9
14.0
15.9
16.9

15.9
18.4
19.0
19.3

77.0
79.2
81.1
82.7

81.0
82.9
84.5
86.0

17.8
19.0
20.2
21.2

19.9
21.1
22.3
23.3

Year
Actual

Projected
2020
2040
2060
2080

Note: The period life expectancy at a given age for a given year

represents the average number of years of life remaining if a group
of persons at that age were to experience the mortality rates for
that year over the course of their remaining lives.
Figure 2. 74 Remaining Life Expectancies for Males at
Various Ages, by Cohorts from 1900 to 2100
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73. THE BD. OF TRUSTEES, FED. OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INS. AND FED.
DISABILITY INS. TR. FUNDS, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES
OF THE FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE AND FEDERAL
DISABILITY INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS 88 tbl.V.A3 (2009), available at

http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/2009/tr09.pdf.
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Despite the fact that life expectancies went up throughout
the twentieth century, there was a trend toward earlier and
earlier retirements until around 1985. For example, Table 7
shows that the average ages at which workers begin receiving
their Social Security retirement benefits fell dramatically from
65.9 in 1965 to 63.6 in 1985, about where it is today. 75 Figure 3
shows how life expectancies at birth have changed compared to the
relatively modest increase in the Social Security full retirement
age from 65 to 67.
Table 7. 76 Percentage of Workers Electing Social Security
Retirement Benefits at Various Ages, Selected Years

Age 65

Ages 66+

Average
age

17.7

23.4

35.9

65.9

35.7

24.5

31.1

8.7

63.9

1985

57.2

21.1

17.7

4.0

63.6

1995

58.3

19.5

16.3

6.0

63.6

2004

57.5

19.0

18.6

4.8

63.7

Year

Age 62

1965

23.0

1975

Ages 63-64

74. FELICITIE C. BELL & MICHAEL L. MILLER, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., LIFE
TABLES FOR THE UNITED STATES SOCIAL SECURITY AREA 1900-2100 165 tbl. 10

(2005).
75. See also Murray Gendell, Older Workers: Increasing Their Labor Force
Participationand Hours of Work, 131 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 1, 51 tbl.10, (2008),
available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2008/O1/art3full.pdf (displaying the
increase in older workers and their hours worked); but see Dan Muldoon &
Richard Kopcke, Are People Claiming Social Security Benefits Later?, 2008
CTR.
FOR
RET.
RES.
AT
B.C.
8-7,
1-2,
available
at
http://crr.bc.edu/images/stories/ib-8-7.pdf (showing that the share of workers
claiming benefit awards at age 62 is starting to fall, with just 56% of women

and 52% of men claiming benefits at 62 in 2006).
76. Gayle L. Reznick, Dave Shoffner & David A. Weaver, Coping with the
Demographic Challenge: Fewer Children and Living Longer, 66 Soc. SEC.
BULL. 4, 43 tbl.4 (2005/2006).
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Figure 3.77 Life Expectancies at Birth versus Social
Security Full Retirement Age
90
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Pertinent here, public sector pension plans often permit
public employees to retire at relatively young ages, and many
workers do. For example, many public employees have "thirty
years and out" pension plans, and "twenty years and out"
78
arrangements are fairly common among law enforcement plans.
One can easily imagine someone joining a police force at age 20,
working for 20 years until retiring at age 40, and drawing a
pension (and retiree health benefits) for 40 years until dying at
age 80. 79 Needless to say, increased life expectancies and early
retirements can drive up benefit costs, and state and local
governments will be hard-pressed to come up with the funds to
pay benefits over ever-longer retirements. 8 0 At the very least,
77. THE BD. OF TRUSTEES, FED. OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INS. AND FED.
DISABILITY INS. TR. FUNDS, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES
OF

THE

FEDERAL

OLD-AGE

AND

SURVIVORS

INSURANCE

AND

FEDERAL

DISABILITY INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS 80 tbl.V.A3, 102 tbl.V.C3 (2005).

78. The normal retirement age for most public employees covered by the
Oklahoma Public Employees Retirement System is age 62 (or when age plus
years of service equals 80 [90 for recent hires]), but certain law enforcement
officers can retire with 20 years of service. OKLA. RET. SYS. REP., supra note
24, at 70.
79. See, e.g., Chuck Bennett, Time Bomb of Young Cops, N.Y. POST, Feb.
23, 2009, available at http://www.nypost.com/seven/02232009/news/regional
news/timebombof__young-cops_156516.htm (describing the drawbacks of the
current pension system through the example of a hypothetical young police

officer retiring early).
80. Early retirement incentives are also sometimes used to fix short-term
budget problems, even though they have long-term costs. See, e.g., Valerie
Bauman, Will State Workers Get an Early Out?, TIMES UNION, Dec. 3, 2008,
available at http://www.timesunion.com/AspStories/story.asp? storyID=746130
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plans must make realistic assumptions about length of service, age
of retirement, and longevity of retirees.
3. Pension Envy
Another pressure on public pensions has to do with the fact
that the pensions that public employees receive are much more
generous than the pensions that are available today in the private
sector. This creates a certain amount of pension envy among the
taxpayers who are called upon to contribute to the generous
8
pensions of their public sector counterparts. '
Today's public sector workers generally came to their jobs
knowing that government work paid less-but that benefits were
more generous.8 2 Needless to say, a lot has changed since then.
Many state and local government workers now make more than
their private sector counterparts, and the gap is widening every
year.8 3 For example, Table 8 shows that in 2008 compensation

&category=STATE (noting the financial issues that state and local
governments will encounter when they encourage early retirement of
employees).
81. See, e.g., PROMISES WITH A PRICE:
PUBLIC SECTOR RETIREMENT
BENEFITS, supra note 5, at 10-11 (explaining this pension envy and noting the
taxpayers' call for reduction in public employee benefits); Pension Res.
Council, The Future of Public Employee Retirement Systems 1 (Pension Res.
Council, Working Paper No. 2008-08, 2008), available at http://www.
pensionresearchcouncil.org/publicationsdocument.php?file=434
(comparing
and contrasting the public-sector and private-sector benefits); Stephanie Fitch,
Gilt-Edged
Pensions,
FORBES,
Feb.
16,
2009,
available
at
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2009/0216/078.html (discussing the disparity in
benefits for the public sector employees); James M. Odato, 6-Figure Club for
School
Retirees,
TIMES
UNION,
June
1,
2008,
available at
http://www.timesunion.com/ASPStories/story.asp?StoryID=692650
(noting
some public-sector retirees with high pensions attain other jobs for even more
income); Cal. Found. for Fiscal Resp., California Pension Reform's 'The
CalPERS 100K Club," http://www.californiapensionreform.comlcalpers (last
visited Sept. 25, 2009) (identifying the number of retired public-sector
employees in California who receive pensions in excess of $100,000).
82. State and local government workers comprised around 12% of the
nation's workforce in 2006. FUNDING FUTURE COSTS, supra note 23, at 1. As
already mentioned, state and local governments typically provide their
workers with a traditional defined benefit pension plan, a supplemental
defined contribution plan for voluntary savings, and a partially-paid retiree
health benefit. In 2006, state and local government pensions covered 18.4
million members and paid out $151.7 billion in benefits to 7.3 million
beneficiaries. STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT RETIREE BENEFITS: CURRENT
FUNDED STATUS OF PENSION AND HEALTH BENEFITS, supra note 51, at 4.
83. For example, from 2000 to 2007, public employees saw a 16% increase
in compensation after adjusting for inflation, compared with just 11% for
private workers. Dennis Cauchon, State, Local Government Workers See Pay
Gains,
USA
TODAY,
Feb.
1,
2008,
available
at
http://www.usatoday.comnews/nation/2008-02-01-civil-servantsN.htm.
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costs averaged $39 an hour in the public sector but just $27 an
hour in the private sector.8 4 At least part of this difference is
likely attributable to the higher average levels of education and
training that are expected for public sector workers (e.g.,
teachers), and public sector workers are more likely to be
85
unionized than private sector workers.
Table

8.86

State and
local

Public and Private Sector Compensation, 2008
Cost per
Hour
$39.18

Benefits
$13.41 (34.2%)

Retirement and
Savings
$3.09 (7.9%)

government
Private
sector

$27.07

$7.93 (29.3%)

$0.79 (3.0%)

Similarly, Table 9 shows that public employees are also far
more likely to have traditional defined benefit pension plans and
retiree health care benefits than private sector workers.8 7 As
already mentioned, however, public sector employees typically
contribute to their traditional defined benefit plans, while private
88
sector employees do not.

84. See also Ken McDonnell, Benefit Cost Comparisons Between State and
Local Government and Private-SectorEmployers, 29 EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST.
NOTES 6, 2 (2008), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/EBRInotes_062008.pdf/ (identifying the table demonstrating that the cost of total publicemployee compensation is greater than total private-employee compensation).
85. Id.; see also Franzel, supra note 4, at 2-3 (finding that state and local
government employees tend to be older and better educated than private
workers).
86. U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., EMPLOYER COSTS FOR
EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION-SEPTEMBER 2008 9 tbl.4 (2008), available at

http://www.bls.gov/news.releaselarchives/ecec-12102008.pdf.
87. See also BOIVIE & ALMEIDA, supra note 43, at 1 (estimating that 80%
of state and local government workers are covered by traditional defined
benefit plans, compared with just 14% of private sector workers); Alicia H.
Munnell, Kelly Haverstick & Mauricio Soto, Why Have Defined Benefit Plans
Survived in the Public Sector?, 2007 CTR. FOR RET. RES. at B.C. 2, 6 (noting
that defined benefit plans are disappearing in the private sector but are still
dominant in the public sector); Press Release, Watson Wyatt Worldwide,
Majority of Fortune 500 Companies Offer Only Defined Contribution Plans to
New Salaried Employees, Watson Wyatt Finds:
Hybrid Pension (Cash
Balance) Plans Become More Prevalent than Traditional Pension Plans for the
First Time (May 11, 2009), http:llwww.watsonwyatt.com/news/press.asp?ID=2
1177 (noting the less desirable benefits of private sector employees).
88. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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Table 9.89 Public and Private Sector Retirement Benefits
Public Sector
Employees
90%

Private Sector
Employees
20%

Median pension in 2005

$17,640

$7,692

Retiree health benefit of
any kind

82%

33%

Defined benefit plan

B. Accounting for PublicPension Plans
Public plans are certainly different from private sector plans.
In particular, while it is not unusual for private companies to go
bankrupt, state and local governments tend to exist perpetually. 90
In any event, the accounting rules applicable to public pension
plans are quite different than those that apply to private sector
pension plans.
As already mentioned, ERISA imposes funding requirements
on private sector pension plans, but it does not apply to public
sector plans. 91 Private sector plans are also subject to strict
accounting rules from the Financial Accounting Standards Board
("FASB"), while public pensions are governed by the more flexible
rules from the GASB.92 Nowhere are these accounting differences
more apparent than when one considers the funding status of
pension plans.
Ideally, pension plans should be 100% funded, and funding
status should be determined by comparing the fair market value of
a plan's assets with the fair market value of its liabilities. If you
hire a worker to do a job today, it makes sense to pay all of the
costs for that worker out of current revenues. That is the whole
purpose of having proper accounting rules and abiding by them.
In the public sector, however, many experts believe that public
plans are "healthy" if they are at least 80% funded,93 and funded
status is based on flexible actuarial valuations of assets and
liabilities, rather than on their actual market values.
89.

PROMISES WITH A PRICE:

PUBLIC SECTOR RETIREMENT BENEFITS,

supra note 5, at 11 tbl.1-3.
90. Of note, however, the city of Vallejo recently declared bankruptcy "after

it was swamped by salary and pension costs." David Cho, Revisions
Consideredfor Valuations of Public Pension Fund Payouts, WASH. POST, Sept.
5, 2008, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2008/09/04/AR2008090403280.html.
91. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
93. FUNDING FUTURE COSTS, supra note 23, at 30.
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Because governments tolerate an 80% funding level and use
actuarial valuations instead of market valuations, public pensions
are almost guaranteed to be underfunded. Public sector workers
tend to get larger pensions as a result, but much of the cost of
those larger pensions is pushed onto future generations of
94
taxpayers.
1.

The Eighty Percent Target

The only reason that anyone thinks that 80% funding may be

"good enough for government" is that we all recognize that when

public pension plans get anywhere close to 100% funded, bad
things happen.95 First, if a public plan is fully funded or
overfunded, beneficiaries will lobby for, and usually get, more
generous benefits, thereby restoring the funded ratio from a good
level to a bad, but politically tolerable, underfunded level. 96 In
Oklahoma, for example, the state provides much of the funds for
At the same time, the
primary and secondary education. 97
Oklahoma Teachers' Retirement System is only about 50%
funded. 98 Nevertheless, Oklahoma teachers spend most of their
lobbying efforts trying to get pay increases, which almost
invariably worsen the funded ratio. 99 When Oklahoma teachers do
lobby about pensions, they usually just ask for ad hoc cost-of-living
adjustments and other benefit enhancements; lobbying for larger
94.

Richard Mattoon, Issues Facing State and Local Government Pensions,

FED. RES. BANK OF CHI. ECON. PERSP., 2, 12 (2007); Robert Novy-Marx &

Joshua D. Rauh, The Intergenerational Transfer of Public Pension Promises
17-21 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 14343, 2008), available
Richard W. Johnson, Pension
at http://www.nber.orgpapers/w14343;
Underfunding and Liberal Retirement Benefits Among State and Local
Government Workers, 50 NAT'L TAX J. 1, 113 (1997), available at http://
ntj.tax.org/wwtax/ntjrec.nsf/2 1e776edlfa8133885256863004a5940/$file/v5On1
113.pdf.
95. To be sure, a funded ratio of less than 100% can be appropriate when
the pension costs grow slower than the tax base. On the other hand, if pension
liabilities are growing faster than the tax base, overfunding is required.
Mattoon, supra note 94, at 12; Munnell, Aubry & Muldoon, supra note 37, at 7
n. 14 and sources cited therein.
96. Mattoon, supra note 94, at 12.
Oklahoma
State
and
Local
Spending,
97. See,
e.g.,
usgovernmentspending.com, http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/
Oklahomastatespending.html.
98. GABRIEL ROEDER SMITH & CO., TEACHERS' RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF
OKLAHOMA ANNUAL ACTUARIAL VALUATION FOR THE YEAR BEGINNING JUNE

available at
httpJ/www.ok.gov/TRS/
30,
2008,
at
2
(2008),
documents/2008%2OActuarial%20Valuation.pdf (showing a funded ratio of
50.5% as of June 30, 2008).
99. To be sure, actuarial reports include a salary increase assumption that
should, over the long run, correspond to the actual pay increases that are
awarded. Id. at 64.
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government contributions to the underfunded pension plan is just
an afterthought. 100
The second disadvantage to fully funded or overfunded
public pension plans is that governors and legislatures call for
contribution cuts and holidays. Politicians would rather spend
money on projects that will bring them more immediate campaign
contributions and votes. 10'
2. Actuarial Versus
Liabilities

Market

Valuation

of Assets

and

Perhaps the hottest debate in public pension plan accounting
has to do with the proper valuation of plan assets and liabilities. 102
It has evolved into a debate between financial economists and
pension plan actuaries.10 3 Financial economists generally believe
100. See, e.g., Steven Brull, Pensions: Ohhhklahoma, INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR, Aug. 2006, available at http://www.iimagazine.com/article.aspx?
articlelD=1051439.
101. See, e.g., Frederick M. Hess & Juliet P. Squire, "But the Pension Fund
Was Just Sitting There. . .": The Politics of Teacher Retirement Plans,
Conference Paper Presented at Rethinking Teacher Retirement Benefit
Systems (Feb. 19-20, 2009), in NAT'L CTR. ON PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES, Feb.
2009, at 3-4, available at http://www.performanceincentives.orgldata
files/news/ConferencePapers2009News/Hess-andSquire_200909.pdf
(using
public-choice theory and interest-group analysis to show how teachers and
politicians cannot help but underfund their public pensions).
102. See, e.g., Mary Williams Walsh, Government Rule Makers Looking at
Pensions, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2008/07/11/business/llgasb.html?_r l&oref=slogin (noting the debate
among actuaries); The Future of Public Employee Retirement Systems, supra
note 81, at 4-8 (analyzing how to properly measure liabilities in the most cost
effective manner); Frank Todisco, Mark-to-Market Valuation at a Crossroads?,
33 AM. AcAD. OF ACTUARIES ENROLLED ACTUARIES REP. 4, 3 (2008), available
at http://www.actuary.org/ear/pdf/winter_2008.pdf (stating that The Pension
Protection Act of 2006 tightened smoothing on both the asset and liability
sides, instigating a debate among practitioners).
103. See, e.g., Jeffrey R. Brown & David W. Wilcox, Discounting State and
Local Pension Liabilities, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 2, 538, 542 (2009) (comparing
and contrasting the practices of financial economists and pension plan
actuaries); Richard M. Ennis, What Ails Public Pensions?, 63 FIN. ANALYSTS J.
6, 38-39 (2007) (illustrating the arguments for both theories); David R. Kass,
Self-Regulation Requires Hard Choices, CONTINGENCIES, July-Aug. 2006, at
14-16, available at http://www.contingencies.org/julaug06/commentary-0706.
pdf (noting the recent difficulties experienced by actuaries in today's practice);
KEITH BRAINARD, NAT'L Assoc. OF ST. RET. ADMINISTRATORS, NASRA WHITE
PAPER: PUBLIC PENSIONS AND MARKET VALUE OF LIABILITIES 1 (2008),
available at http://www.nasra.org/resources/MVL/NASRA%20MVL%20white
%20paper.pdf (introducing each party's various standards to the debate
between financial economists and pension plan actuaries); Soc'Y OF
ACTUARIES AND AM. AcAD. OF ACTUARIES, PENSION ACTUARY'S GUIDE TO
FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 8 (2006), availableat http://www.actuary.orgpdfl
pension/finguide.pdf (providing an overview of the application of financial
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that pension assets should be valued at their current market price
and that liabilities should be valued using a "risk-free" rate of
return, 104 like the roughly 4% rate of return on long-term Treasury
Bonds. This is sometimes referred to as the mark-to-market
approach. 10 5 On the other hand, pension plan actuaries like to use
smoothed values for assets, with market values averaged out over
a period of years; they also like to use discount rates that are often
10 6
substantially higher than the risk-free rate of return.
In the private sector, the difference between the market
value of pension assets and pension liabilities, however calculated,
shows up as part of the annual financial reports of the
corporations that sponsor private pension plans. These days,
pension actuaries advise corporations to smooth the value of their
pension assets out over 24 months and to value their assets using
a discount rate based on the interest rate for long-term corporate
bonds, around 6.38% in 2008.107 Financial economists generally
believe that this approach distorts the value of corporations. 108 In
economics to pension plans); Nat'l Conf. on Pub. Emp. Ret. Sys., The
Advantages of Using Conventional Actuarial Approaches for Valuing Public
Pension Plans, NCPERS RES. SER., Nov. 2008, at 1-4, available at
http://www.ncpers.org/News/PageText/documents/ResearchSeriesIII .pdf
(noting the advantages of using conventional actuarial approaches); Andrew
D. Wozniak & Peter S. Austin, U.S. Public Pensions at a Crossroad: Which
Way Forward?, BANK OF N.Y. MELLON ASSET MGMT., May 2008, at 1, 4-5
(criticizing the public plan actuarial method).
104. PENSION ACTUARY'S GUIDE TO FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, supra note 103,
at 25.
105.
See, e.g., Todisco, supra note 102, at 3 (noting an increased resistance
to the market-to-market approach).
106. Wozniak & Austin, supra note 103, at 4.
107. See Fin. Acct. Standards Bd., Summary of Statement No. 158:
Employer's Accounting for Defined Benefit Pension and Other Postretirement
Plans--An Amendment of FASB Statements No. 87, 88, 106, and 132(R),
http://www.fasb.org/summary/stsum158.shtml (last visited Oct. 24, 2009)
(discussing the effective dates for measurement and the specific facets of what
pension actuaries advise their clients to do). The Internal Revenue Service
permits defined benefit plans to smooth the market values of assets over 24
months. Rev. Proc. 2009-22, 2009-14 I.R.B. 741; Florence Olsen, Pension
Actuaries Welcome IRS Guidance on Applying 24-Month Asset Smoothing
Rules, 36 BUREAU OF NAT'L AFF. PENSION & BENEFITS REP. 12, 669 (2009);
Rob Kozlowski, 5 Years of Corporate Funding Gains Gone, PENSIONS &
INVESTMENTS, June 1, 2009, availableat http://www.pionine.com/article/2009
0601/PRINTSUB/306019980; see also WILSHIRE CONSULTING, 2009 WILSHIRE
CONSULTING REPORT ON CORPORATE PENSION FUNDING LEVELS 7-9 (2009),
availableat http://www.wilshire.com/ BusinessUnits/Consulting/Investment/
2009_-CorporateFundingReport.pdf (considering the annual effect on the
growth of assets and liabilities).
108. See generally Gale E. Newell, Jerry G. Kreuze & David Hurtt,
CorporatePension Plans: How Consistent Are the Assumptions in Determining
Pension Funding Status?, 17 AM. J. OF BUS. 22 (2002), available at
http://www.bsu.edu/mcobwin/majbPp=201.
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particular, using a discount rate higher than the risk-free rate can
understate the magnitude of corporate pension plan liabilities.10 9
To be sure, financial economists reserve most of their rancor
about the understatement of pension liabilities for public sector
pension plans. In that regard, public sector pension plans tend to
use actuarially smoothed values for their assets, with market
values averaged out over anywhere from three to 15 years. 110
More significantly, instead of using the risk-free Treasury Bond
rate to discount their liabilities, or even the somewhat higher
corporate bond rate used by private sector plans, public pension
plans typically use discount rates based on their own, much higher
investment return assumptions, typically around 8%.111 According
to the financial economists, choosing such high discount rates
invariably leads to much lower estimates of pension plan liabilities
and so results in significant overstatements of the funded status of
most public plans. 112 For example, a plan that was 100% funded
under the actuarial approach might be just 80- or 85% funded
under the financial economics approach. 113 Of course, public plans
that purport to be a "healthy" 80% funded under the conventional
actuarial approach are really just 65% or 70% funded when viewed
114
from the financial economics approach.
109. See generally id.
110. As already mentioned, OPERS uses five-year smoothing. See supra
note 24 and accompanying text.
111. The Future of Public Employee Retirement Systems, supra note 81, at 5.
Appendix Table 1 shows the investment return assumptions for 109 state
pension plans, ranging from 7.0% to 8.5%. See also Pub. Fund Surv., Key
Actuarial Assumptions, http://www.publicfundsurvey.org/publicfundsurvey/
index.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2009) (surveying the retirement system annual
financial reports and interviewing the retirement system staff members).
112. Gabriel Roeder Smith & Co., Valuing Public Pension Plans:
ComparingFinancialEconomics with ConventionalApproaches, GRS INSIGHT,
Apr. 2008, at 2, available at http://www.gabrielroeder.com/news/pdf
_insight/insight2008_-04.pdf. In general, the financial economics approach
"produces a measure of... pension liability that [is] roughly 15% higher" than
the conventional actuarial approach. Id.
113. Id.
114. Another difference between public and private plan accounting has to
do with the measurement of benefit obligations. Ennis, supra note 103, at 3940. The FASB requires private plans to disclose both the plan's accumulated
benefit obligation ("ABO") and its projected benefit obligation ("PBO'). Id. at
39. Both measure benefits accrued to date, discounted at the long-term bond
rate. Id. PBO is larger than ABO because PBO takes into account projected
wage increases, whereas ABO reflects the plan's liability if it terminated now.
Id. On the other hand, the GASB requires public plans to disclose actuarial
accrued liability, which like PBO, incorporates projected wage increases. Id.
But, of course, public plans can use the much higher actuarial discount rate
(typically around 8%). Id. Pertinent here, a recent National Association of
State Retirement Administrators survey of 101 state retirement plans found
that those plans were, on average, 87% funded in 2005 using the conventional

The John Marshall Law Review

[42:837

While the debate has a lot more wrinkles, financial
economists argue that when public pension plan actuaries use
high discount rates, they inevitably understate plan liabilities and
push costs onto future generations of taxpayers. 115 Most public
pension plan actuaries, on the other hand, contend that it is
completely appropriate to use those high discount rates because
state and local governments will be around for the long haul, they
have historically earned those high rates of return on plan assets,
and they can reasonably be expected to earn these high rates of
return in the future.11 6 Public sector actuaries even assert that
using the risk-free rate to discount liabilities would lead to an
overstatement of the funded status of plans and so result in
overcharging current taxpayers to the benefit of future generations
1 17
of taxpayers.
This debate has been raging for years and shows no sign of
letting up any time soon. The GASB and the Actuarial Standards
Board are both studying the issue. 118 As more information is
actuarial approach permitted by GASB. Id. Using the same data, and a 5.5%
discount rate, Richard M. Ennis, CFA, estimated that those plans were really
just 62% funded under a PBO FASB-type approach and just 75% funded under
an ABO FASB-type approach. Id. at 39-40.
115. See, e.g., id. at 38-40 (discussing the negative consequences of actuarial
conventions); Jeremy Gold & Gordon Latter, The Case for Making Public Plan
Liabilities to Market 6-7 (Pension Res. Council, Working Paper No. 2008-20,
2008), available at http://www.pensionfmance.org/papers/TheCaseforMarking
PublicPensionPlanLiabilitiestoMarket.pdf (analyzing discount rates).
116. See, e.g., Dimitry Mindlin, In Support of the Weatherman,
CONTINGENCIES, May/June
2008, at 36, available at http://www.
contingencies.org/mayjun08/weatherman.pdf (discussing the contentions of
financial economists and actuaries); Stephen T. McElhaney, Presentation,
Estimating State and Local Government Pension and Retiree Health Care
Liabilities, PENSION RES. COUNCIL, May 1, 2008, at 7 (noting the various
arguments of pension plan actuaries).
117. See generally Mindlin, supra note 116; McElhaney, supra note 116.
118. See, e.g., Governmental Acct. Standards Bd., The User's Perspective:
Looking Back at Ten Years of Pension Reporting (Dec. 2008),
(noting the
http://www.gasb.org/newsletter/pensionjreporting_dec2008.htm
Board's research and its implications); Governmental Acct. Standards Bd.,
Invitation to Comment: Pension Accounting and Financial Reporting, 2009
STANDARDS
SER.
34,
26-37, available at
GOVERNMENTAL
ACCT.
http://www.gasb.org/exp/itc-pension-accountingand fmafmanreporting.pdf
(addressing the issues associated with pension accounting and financial
reporting from the perspective of the GASB); Actuarial Standards Bd., Request
for Comments -Actuarial Standard of Practice (ASOP) No. 27, Mar. 27, 2008,
at
1-4,
http://www.actuarialstandardsboard.net/pdf/ASOPI27_RFC.pdf
(outlining a selection of economic assumptions for measuring pension
obligations); Paul Zorn, The GASB's Invitation to Comment on Pension
Accounting and Reporting Standards, GRS INSIGHT, May 2009, at 7-8,
available at
http://www.grsnet.com/news/pdf-insightlinsight2009_O5.pdf
(noting the alternatives to the present system); Keith Brainard, Plan
Sponsors: Orthodoxy? Actuaries Follow Current Standard, PENSIONS &
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usually better, some observers believe that the best approach is to
provide both types of liability and funded ratio estimates. In that
regard, for example, the New York City Retirement System
includes both actuarial and market valuations in its annual
reports. 119
Another difference between private and public pension plans
has to do with how quickly they are required to reach full funding.
As already mentioned, ERISA generally requires private pension
plans to make up any funding shortfall in 7 years, but that rule
does not apply to public plans. 120 Instead, the GASB permits plans
1 21
to use an amortization period of up to 30 years.
All in all, accounting matters, and properly accounting for
pension liabilities is likely to result in better funding of public
122
pension plans.
INVESTMENTS, May 4, 2009, available at http://www.pionline.comlarticle/
20090601/PRINTSUB/306019998 (stating that the GASB and the Actuarial
Standards Board have been slow to deal with the valuation issue, but
nonetheless are addressing it).
119. See, e.g., Mary William Walsh & Michael Cooper, New York Gets
Sobering Look at Its Pensions, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2006, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/200608/20lnyregion/2Opension.html? r=1&pagewant
ed-print (discussing New York's retirement system); THE N.Y. CITY EMP. RET.
SYS. AND N.Y. CITY PUB. EMP. GROUP LIFE INS., COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL
FINANCIAL REPORT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2008 155 (2008),
available
at
http://www.nycers.org/(S(cxnnws45ixaok245ihj5l355))/
Pdf/cafr/2008/NYCERSfinal.pdf (analyzing the New York City Retirement
System for the fiscal year 2008).
Even providing alternative numbers may not provide sufficient
information about the distribution of possible funding outcomes. See, e.g.,
DAVID BLAKE, ZAKI KHORASANEE, JOHN PICKLES & DAVID TYRRALL, THE
PENSIONS INST., AN UNREAL NUMBER: How COMPANY PENSION ACCOUNTING
FOSTERS AN ILLUSION OF CERTAINTY 5, 40-41 (2008), available at
http://www.pensions-institute.org/reports/unrealnumber.pdf (suggesting that
so-called fan charts do a better job than any single number at conveying useful
information about the range of possible funding outcomes, particularly over
the decades of pension promises).
120. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (explaining applicable
ERISA funding rules and employer obligations).
121. See, e.g., Munnell, Aubry & Muldoon, supra note 37, at 5 (noting that
in 2006 the amortization period was reduced to thirty years). Pertinent here,
as of June 30, 2008, the Oklahoma Public Employees Retirement plan had 19
years left in the thirty-year amortization period that it had earlier adopted
with respect to its unfunded actuarial accrued liability. OKLA. RET. SYS. REP.,
supra note 24, at 64.
122. See, e.g., Paraskevi (Vicky) Kiosse & Ken Peasnell, Have Changes in
Pension Accounting Changed Pension Provision?: A Review of the Evidence,
Conference Paper Presented at The Institute of Chartered Accountants in
England and Wales 2008 Information for Better Markets Conference 27-29
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
(Mar.
11,
2009),
papers.cfm?abstractid=1365368 (presenting and considering alternatives to
the current system).
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C. Legal Limitations on PublicPension PlanReform
Most state and local workers also have better legal
protections for their pensions than their private sector
counterparts. Through state constitutional provisions and court
interpretations of property and contract rights, most states
essentially guarantee that their public workers will get the
pensions that they were promised when they were hired. 123 The
effect of this "anti-reduction" rule is that public employers can
124
rarely cut pension benefits for current workers or retirees.
Instead, pension and benefit changes typically only apply to newly
hired workers. Insert worker, and wait 30 or 40 years to see any
financial savings. 125 This anti-reduction rule is unduly generous.
On the other hand, the benefit-protection rule that covers
private sector workers seems more realistic for promises that can
last for decades. ERISA's so-called "anti-cutback" rule protects
pension benefits that have already been earned, but it does not
126
guarantee that an employee will receive future benefit accruals.
More specifically, employers are generally free to cut future
benefit accruals, or even terminate their pension plans, but they
cannot take away an employee's already accrued benefits.
Needless to say, we have seen a remarkable number of freezes and
27
terminations of private sector plans in recent years. 1
123. See, e.g., Amy Monahan, Legal Limitations on Pension Plan Reform,
Conference Paper Presented at Rethinking Teacher Retirement Benefit
Systems (Feb. 19-20, 2009), in NAT'L CTR. ON PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES, Feb.
2009, at 1, 3-11, available at http://www.performanceincentives.org/datal
files/news/ConferencePapers2009News/Monahan 200908_Final.pdf
(discussing how significant changes in the last century have taken place in
regards to the legal protections of public pensions); Bovbjerg, supra note 4, at
11-14 (explaining state and local government sectors); see also FUNDING
FUTURE COSTS, supra note 23, at 18-20 (discussing the current status of state
and local government pension plans and noting that policy makers and voters
will need to decide how to control future costs and the appropriate level of
benefits); Nat'l Conf. on Pub. Emp. Ret. Sys., State Constitutional Protections
for Public Sector Retirement Benefits, http://www.ncpers.org/Files/News/031
52007RetireBenefitProtections.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2009) (summarizing
all fifty states' laws on public sector retirement benefits).
124. FUNDING FUTURE COSTS, supranote 23, at 20-21.
125. Id. at 21, 32.
126. ERISA § 204(g)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g)(1), I.R.C. § 411(d)(6).
127. See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO 08-817, DEFINED
BENEFIT PLANS: PLAN FREEZES AFFECT MILLIONS OF PARTICIPANTS AND MAY
POSE RETIREMENT INCOME CHALLENGES 1, 4-8, 25 (2008), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08817.pdf (discussing generally the freezing of
defined benefit plants); Jack VanDerhei, Defined Benefit Plan Freezes: Who's
Affected, How Much, and Replacing Lost Accruals, 2006 EMP. BENEFIT RES.
INST. ISSUE BRIEF 291, 1, 3-6, available at http://www.ebri.orgtpdf/
briefspdffEBRI IB 03-20063.pdf (discussing the effect freezing defined benefit
plans have on its participants); Alicia H. Munnell & Mauricio Soto, Why Are
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State and local governments were unwise to promise
generous pensions without adequately funding them, or without at
least reserving the right to cut future benefit accruals. 128 But
state and local governments did make those generous pension
promises, and now they will have to honor them. Integrity and
contracts are about doing what you promised to do even when it
becomes inconvenient. Still, it would make sense for the states to
adopt constitutional amendments or statutes that embrace an
ERISA-style anti-cutback rule for new state and local government
workers. New workers should be able to count on pension benefits
as they earn them, but state and local governments should be free
to cut future benefit accruals for those new workers.

III.

How TO ENSURE ADEQUATE FUNDING

If you find yourself in a hole, the first thing to do is to stop
digging. Next you need to climb out. Finally, you need to avoid
falling into holes in the future.
A.

Stop Digging: Stop PromisingBenefits
Without Paying for Them

At the outset, state and local governments need to stop
enhancing benefits without paying for them. To be sure, it is
difficult for legislators to resist enhancing the benefits of current
workers at the expense of future taxpayers. One approach would
be to require strict actuarial review of pension legislation as a way
to achieve some measure of fiscal self-discipline in the short term.
For example, in 2006 Oklahoma enacted actuarial limits on
pension benefit increases. 129 Under this approach, which followed
Companies Freezing Their Pensions? 13-14 (Ctr. for Ret. Res. at B.C., Working
Paper No. 2007-22, 2007) (addressing employers' choice to freeze plans rather
than terminate them). Economic forces are responsible for much of the
increase in freezes and terminations of traditional private sector defined
benefit plans, but other negatives include the ever-increasing costs to comply
with ERISA and the PBGC premiums. Munnell & Soto, supra at 4-7.
128. Again, if you hire a worker to do a job today, it makes sense to pay all
of the costs for that worker out of current revenues, not push the liability onto
future generations of taxpayers. See, e.g., Mattoon, supra note 94, at 2, 12-13
(noting that pension costs may be "shifted to future workers").
129. Oklahoma Pension Legislation Actuarial Analysis Act, OKL. ST. ANN.
tit. 62, §§ 3101-14 (West 2006). The legislation applies to most state public
pension plans. Tit. 62, § 3102.
The legislation has three (3) prominent features. All retirement bills
with fiscal impact must be introduced in odd years and voted on in evennumbered years. This can be bypassed for an "emergency" bill by a 3/4
vote of each house. Each such bill must be analyzed for actuarial fiscal
impact by a "Legislative Actuary." The actuary is hired by the
Legislative Service Bureau. Finally, any retirement bill with fiscal
impact must contain adequate funding either through a lump-sum
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earlier legislation in Georgia, retirement bills with a fiscal impact
can only be introduced in the first year after an election, and those
bills can only be enacted in the following year, after actuarial
130
review.
Moreover, no amendments that increase the cost of the bill
can be made after it has been actuarially reviewed. 131
Furthermore, if no specific provision is made to fund the
legislation, the bill is automatically repealed.132 The Georgia
legislation went even further: Georgia is required to maintain
minimum funding standards for its pension plans, and each year it
must contribute the pension plan's normal cost plus the amount
needed to amortize the plan's unfunded liability. 133 Along the
same lines, a handful of states have constitutional provisions that
require actuarial funding of their state retirement plans. 134
Every year, legislators in the several states introduce dozens
of bills affecting pensions, and many of those bills enhance
benefits and hurt funded ratios. 135 With strict actuarial review of
pension legislation, state and local governments would be better
informed of the actuarial costs of pension benefit increases and
would have to take the time to consider all proposed changes.
appropriation or an increase in contributions sufficient to pay the cost of

the change. The bill permits the Legislature to grant [COLAs] without
following the restrictions in the bill. COLAs can be given by the
Legislature as long as they do not exceed the actuarial assumption of
the System. [For example,] OPERS assumes it will pay a 2% COLA
each year for actuarial purposes.
Okla. Pub. Emp. Ret. Sys., Legislation: 2006 Legislation, http://www.opers.
ok.gov/legislation (last visited Nov. 19, 2009). See also Ronald K Snell,
Pensions and Retirement Plan Enactments in 2007 State Legislatures, NAT'L
CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, Oct. 2007, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid

=13404.
130. Tit. 62, §§ 3106-11.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See generally Public Retirement Systems Standards Law, GA. CODE
ANN. § 47-20 (West 2009).
134. See ME. CONST., art. IX, §§ 18-A & 18-B (establishing that all
retirement and ancillary benefits must be annually funded and on an
actuarially sound basis); MONT. CONST., art. VIII, § 15 (stating that public

retirement systems shall be "funded on an actuarially sound basis"); S.C.
CONST., art. X, § 16 (outlining that the General Assembly of South Carolina
will "appropriate funds" from all "state-operated retirement system[s] which

will insure the availability of funds to meet all normal and accrued liability of
the system on a sound actuarial basis as determined by the governing body of
the system").
135. See, e.g., RONALD SNELL, NAT'L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, STATE
PENSION AND RETIREMENT LEGISLATION IN 2009 15-18 (2009), available at

http://www.ncsl.org/print/standcomm/sclaborecon/StatePensionLegJanMar200
9.pdf (summarizing numerous 2009 bill proposals aimed at increasing benefits
without necessarily providing for adequate funding).
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B.

Climb out: Make the Actuarial Required
ContributionsEach Year

Of course, the best way to ensure that public pension plans
are fully funded would be to require them to pay the actuarial
required contributions ("ARC") in full each year. 136 This annual
pension cost is the amount of funding needed to pay for the new
liabilities that accrue each year (i.e., normal cost), and pay off a
portion of the plan's unfunded liabilities accrued in previous years
(i.e., its unfunded actuarial accrued liability). Only about half of
state pension plans made their actuarial required contributions in
2006.137
Improving plan governance could also have a significant
impact on investment performance and funding status. 138 The
composition of the board can also make a difference, and the best
boards are probably dominated by independent experts (i.e.,
nonemployees). For example, one study found that boards that
have more retired employee participation tend to have lower
investment performance, and boards that have more active
employee participation tend to have relatively lower allocations to
stocks. 139 Better reporting of financial, actuarial, statistical, and
136. Mattoon, supra note 94, at 15.
137.

PROMISES WITH A PRICE:

PUBLIC SECTOR RETIREMENT BENEFITS,

supra note 5, at 25; see also Alicia H. Munnell, Kelly Haverstick, Jean-Pierre
Aubry & Alex Golub-Sass, Why Don't Some States and Localities Pay Their
Required Pension Contributions? 2008 CTR. FOR RET. RES. AT B.C. 7, 1-3
(discussing the funding of public pensions plans and why some plans fail to
meet target contributions amounts).
138. Pertinent here, Hess and Squire outline numerous recent instances of
incompetence and self-dealing by some public pension plan boards. See
generally, Hess & Squire, supra note 101; David Hess, Protecting and
PoliticizingPublic Pension Fund Assets: EmpiricalEvidence on the Effects of
GovernanceStructures and Practices, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 187 (2005); Susan
Saulny & Karen Ann Cullotta, Illinois Enacts Post-Blagojevich Reform of
Public Worker Pension Boards, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2009, available at
http'J/www.nytimes.com/2009/04/04/us/04illinois.html; David Evans, Hidden
Pension Fiasco May Foment Another $1 Trillion Bailout, BLOOMBERG.COM,
Apr. 7, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 20601109&refer=ho
me&sid=alwTEOZ5.1EA; Alicia Munnell, Should Public Plans Engage in
Social Investing?, 2007 CTR. FOR RET. RES. AT B.C. 7-12; see also Tim V. Eaton

& John R. Nofsinger, The Effect of Financial Constraints and Political
Pressureon the Management of Public Pension Plans, 23 J. OF ACCT. & PUB.
POL'Y 161, 164-68 (2004) (finding that public plans subject to financial
constraints and political pressures tend to have more optimistic actuarial
assumptions and tend to be more underfunded).
139. Tongxuan (Stella) Yang &
Olivia S. Mitchell, Public Pension
Governance, Funding and Performance: A Longitudinal Appraisal, in
PENSION FUND GOVERNANCE: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE ON FINANCIAL
REGULATION 179 (John Evans, Micheal Orszag & John Piggott eds., 2008); but
see Joel T. Harper, Public Sector Pension Governance in the United States: Up
to the Task?, 1 ROTMAN INT'L J. OF PENSION MGMT. 1, 22 (2008) (failing to find
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investment information is also correlated with higher investment
returns. 140 Better training of board members should also result in
better investment performance and funding.141
C. Avoid Future Holes: Restructure PublicPensions
Finally, to avoid future holes, state and local governments
should think about completely restructuring their pension plans,
at least for new workers. State and local governments should
continue to provide adequate retirement incomes for their
workers, but workers should have to work longer to earn those
benefits. 142 In that regard, most state and local governments will
want to increase the age and service requirements for pension
benefits, and many will want to increase employee contributions.
States should also correct any abuses, such as the pension
"spiking" that occurs when workers are able to artificially inflate
their final-average-pay in order to jack up their pension
benefits. 143 Similarly, it would make sense to require actuarial
neutrality for early retirement benefits and for dependent and
survivor benefits. 44 As already mentioned, states should also
abandon the anti-reduction rule (where promised pensions can
never be changed) in favor of an ERISA-style anti-cutback rule for
new state and local government workers (where accrued benefits
1 5
are protected but future benefits can be cut). 4
a direct relationship between board composition and investment returns); see
generally Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate
Governance Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795 (1993); Julia L. Coronado,

Eric M. Engen & Brian Knight, Public Funds and Private Capital Markets:
The Investment Practices and Performance of State and Local PensionFunds,
56 NAT'L TAX J. 579, 580, 584-86 (2003).
140. See generally Yang & Mitchell, supra note 139.
141.

Id.

142. See, e.g., Danny Hakim, Paterson and Unions Agree on Limits for New
Pensions, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1999, at Al (raising the retirement age for

future New York state employees from 55 to 62).
143. See, e.g., Matt Viser, Responding to Outcry, Senate Unveils Pension
Reform Plan, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 30, 2009, available at http://www.boston.

con/news/localreaking-news/2009/03/respondingtoo.html
(describing
legislative proposals in Massachusetts aimed at comprehensively reforming
the State's public pension plan); Girard Miller, How to Avoid Audit and Avoid
Pension
'Spiking,'
GOVERNING,
Nov.
6,
http://www.governing.com/articles/0811gmillera.htm

2008,
available at
(advocating reform of

public employee retirement systems to prevent pension spiking); Nicole
Milstead, Lawmakers' Pension Perk Scrapped; Now They're Like Other State
Workers, DAILY HERALD, May 13, 2009, available at http://www.dailyherald.

comlstory/?id=293497 (curbing the lucrative pension perks of state legislators
in Illinois).
144. Girard Miller, Taking on the Sacred Cows, GOVERNING, Mar. 5, 2009,
available at http://www.governing.com/articles/0903gmillera.htm.

145. See supra note 123-28 and accompanying text (encouraging States to
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Of course, more dramatic restructuring of public pension
plans is probably necessary. Many analysts have suggested
replacing the traditional defined benefit plans with defined
contribution plans, which, by their nature, are fully funded. 146 In
that regard, a few states have replaced their primary pension
plans with defined contribution plans, and many states have
147
added supplemental defined contribution plans.
But I think there is a better approach: state and local
governments should gradually shift from traditional final-averagepay defined benefit plans to cash balance plans. A cash balance
plan is a defined benefit plan that looks like a defined contribution
plan. 148

Like defined contribution plans, cash balance plans

adopt constitutional amendments or statutes that embrace ERISA-style anticutback rules for new state and local government workers).
146. See, e.g., Karen Eilers Lahey & T. Leigh Anenson, Public Pension
Liability: Why Reform Is Necessary to Save the Retirement of State Employees,
21 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 307, 309, 320-32 (2007) (proposing
that states not only adopt defined plans but also disclose the financial status
of their public pension plans); Alicia H. Munnell, Alex Golub-Sass, Kelly
Haverstick, Mauricio Soto &
Gregory Wiles, Why Have Some States
Introduced Defined Contribution Plans?, 2008 CTR. FOR RET. RES. AT B.C. 3, 25 (describing the overall benefits of public pensions that utilize defined
contribution plans in comparison to public pension plans that employ the more
traditional defined benefit plans); see also Jonathan B. Forman, Public
Pensions: Choosing Between Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Plans,
1999 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 187 (2000) for the citations referenced
within the Article. Also see the discussion of funding levels and defined
contribution plans in note 17 supra.
147. See, e.g., Judy Ward, State Plan Sponsor of the Year: A Lesson in
Funding, PLAN SPONSOR, Mar. 2009, at 48-49 (noting that the West Virginia
teachers' plan recently shifted from a defined benefit plan to a defined
contribution plan, and now has shifted back); see also Timothy Inklebarger,
Pension Funds: Alaska Grows Cold on Its 401(a) Plan; State Legislation
Could Bring Back Defined Benefit Plan for State, Municipal Workers,
PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Mar. 9, 2009, at 4, 25, available at http://www.
pionline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20090309/PRINTSUB/303099984&crit
=alaska%20grows%20cold (describing Alaska's decision to revert back to
defined benefit plans from defined contribution plans and identifying 10
states-Oregon, Indiana, Florida, Washington, Ohio, Montana, North Dakota,
Colorado, South Dakota, and Vermont-that use defined contribution plans
either in addition to or as an optional alternative to defined benefit plans);
Elayne Robertson Demby, Buyer's Remorse?: Defined Contribution Getting the
Cold Shoulder in Alaska, PLAN SPONSOR, May 2009, at 51-54 (noting that
Alaska, which recently shifted from a defined benefit plan to a defined
contribution plan, is now thinking about shifting back).
148. See Jonathan Barry Forman & Amy Nixon, Cash Balance Pension
Plan Conversions, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 379, 380 (2000) (noting the current
trend in which some companies are replacing their traditional pension plans
with cash balance plans); JANET S. HANSEN, TEACHER PENSIONS:
A
BACKGROUND PAPER, COMM. FOR ECON. DEV. 32-34 (2008), available at
http://www.ced.org/images/library/reportseducation/report-educ200806pensio
ns.pdf (stating that cash balance plans strike a balance between defined
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provide workers with individual accounts (albeit hypothetical
accounts). 149 Like traditional final-average-pay defined benefit
plans, however, the assets would be pooled and managed by
professional investors, and benefits should be paid out in the form
50
of lifetime annuities.
For example, a simple cash balance plan might allocate 10%
of each worker's salary to his/her account each year and credit the
account with 5% interest on the balance. 15 1 Under such a plan, a
worker who earned $30,000 in a given year would get an annual
cash balance credit of $3,000 ($3,000 = 10% x $30,000), plus an
interest credit equal to 5% of the balance in her hypothetical
15 2
account as of the beginning of the year.
Why move to a cash balance plan? There are three principal
reasons.
First, defined contribution plans are simply poor
retirement savings vehicles. 53 In general, individuals are lousy
investors. They either invest too conservatively or take too much
risk. Individual investors also pay much higher fees than large
public pension plans. And while traditional final-average-pay
pensions pay benefits out as lifetime annuities, defined
contribution plans typically make lump-sum distributions that are
all too quickly spent.
Second, as we have seen in this Article, traditional finalaverage-pay defined benefit plans tend to become dramatically
underfunded, particularly as an employer's workforce ages.
Pension benefits typically accrue differently under traditional
final-average-pay plans and cash balance plans. 5 4 Indeed, one of
the most obvious features of traditional final-average-pay plans is
that they are "backloaded."' 55 That is, traditional plans tend to
disproportionately favor older workers who have stayed with an
employer for 25 or 30 years. 15 6 On the other hand, cash balance
plans (and defined contribution plans) typically provide more

benefit and defined contribution plans).
149. Forman & Nixon, supranote 148, at 380-81.
150. Like traditional defined benefit plans, employer contributions are
based on actuarial valuations, and the employer bears all of the investment
risks and responsibilities. Id. at 385-86.

151. Id. at 396.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 397-98.
154.

See, e.g., FORMAN, supra note 6, at 227-28.

155. Id.
156. Id. The primary reason for this back-loading is that the value of
benefit accruals typically increases as a percentage of pay as workers
approach retirement age. In fact, well over half the value of a worker's
pension can accrue in the last 5 or 10 years of service. Id.
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uniform accruals over a worker's career. That uniformity makes it
1
easier to predict and fund the employer's liability. 57
Third, traditional final-average-pay plans have perverse
work incentives and disincentives. 15 For example, final-averagepay plans penalize workers who change jobs frequently. 159 Finalaverage-pay plans also create large financial incentives for
workers to stay on the job at least until they are eligible for early
retirement. 60 Worst of all, however, final-average-pay plans
impose large financial penalties on older workers that push them
into early retirement just when those workers should instead be
encouraged to work longer and save more for their eventual
6
retirements.1 1
To be sure, state and local governments should honor the
traditional final-average-pay pension promises that they have
made to current public employees. Having paid relatively lower
salaries to public employees when they were young, state and local
governments need to provide the generous pensions that were
promised to those workers when they are old.162
But it would certainly make a lot of sense for state and local
governments to adopt a more rational compensation system for
their new employees. That is where cash balance plans come in.
State and local governments should amend their pension plans so
that new workers earn pension accruals under the cash balance
approach. At the same time, state and local governments need to
adopt laws to ensure that they make contributions that are
adequate to fully fund their liabilities to current and past workers
163
and to fully fund their benefit promises to new workers.
157. Id. at 227.
158. See, e.g., id. at 227-31 (explaining that workers who reach retirement
age yet continue to work often lose a significant amount of their pension
wealth as a result); Robert M. Costrell & Michael Podgursky, Peaks, Cliffs &
Valleys: The PeculiarIncentives of Teacher Pensions, 8 EDU. NEXT 1, 22 (2008)
(describing the incentive for teachers to remain employed until they reach a
certain step on their district's pay scale so that they can maximize their
pension benefits, and the disincentive that exists if a teacher continues to
work after they reach a certain step based on over-taxation in relation to
salary).
159. FORMAN, supranote 6, at 228.
160. Id. at 227-31. While it makes sense to keep employees in the work
force until they have adequate retirement savings, it is not at all clear that
employees should be incented to stay with any particular employer.
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., Bernard Casey, Incentives and Disincentives to Early and Late
Retirement 6 (Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev., Working Paper No. AWP
3.3, 1997), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/5/2428694.pdf
(referring to these kinds of final-average-pay plans as implicit contracts under
which workers take less pay when they are young in exchange for greater
pension benefits later).
163. Plans might also develop mechanisms to allow current employees to
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CONCLUSION

The recent economic downturn will present challenges for
state and local government pension plans. These plans were
underfunded before the downturn, and the recession has, and will,
exacerbate their funding shortfalls. The silver lining in this
otherwise dark economic cloud is that state and local governments
will finally have the political motivation to restructure their
traditional pension systems.

shift toward the cash balance approach. Such elections could be particularly
attractive to older workers who would rather keep working than retire and to
younger workers who expect to change jobs before earning the late-in-career
benefit increases that are implicit in back-loaded traditional defined benefit
plans. See, e.g., Richard W. Johnson, Gordon Mermin & C. Eugene Steuerle,
Work Impediments at Older Ages, in THE RETIREMENT SERIES 2006, at 18-20,
34 (The Urb. Inst., Discussion Paper Series No. 06-02, 2006) (noting that
making it easier for employers to convert their traditional defined benefit
plans to cash balance plans would help eliminate work disincentives from
their plans).
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Appendix Table 1.164 Public Plan Investment Assumptions
and Funded Ratios 2006

Plan Name

Valuation
Date

Alabama ERS

9/30/2006

8

81.1

Alabama Teachers

9/30/2006

8

82.8

Alaska PERS

6/30/2006

8.2

78.2

Alaska Teachers
Arizona Public Safety
Personnel

6/30/2006

8.2

67.8

6/30/2006

8.5

77

Arizona SRS

6/30/2006

8

84.3

Arkansas PERS
Arkansas Teachers

6/30/2006
6/30/2006

8
8

83.4
80.3

California PERS

6/30/2006

7.7

87.2

California Teachers

6/30/2006

8

87

Colorado Municipal

12/31/2006

8.5

79.5

Colorado School

12/31/2006

8.5

74.1

Colorado State

12/31/2006

8.5

73

Connecticut SERS

6/30/2006

8.5

53.2

Connecticut Teachers
DC Police & Fire

6/30/2006
10/1/2006

8.5
7.2

63
100

DC Teachers

10/1/2006

7.2

100

Delaware State Employees

6/30/2006

8

101.7

Florida RS

7/1/2006

7.7

105.6

Georgia ERS

6/30/2006

7.5

94.5

Georgia Teachers

6/30/2006

7.5

96.5

Hawaii ERS

6/30/2006

8

65

Idaho PERS

7/1/2006

7.7

95.2

Illinois Municipal

12/31/2006

7.5

95.3

Illinois SERS

6/30/2006

8.5

52.2

164.

Ctr.

for Ret.

Res.

at

B.C.,

State

and Local

Pension

Data,

http://crr.bc.edu/frequently-requesteddata/state-and-local-pension-data_4.h
tml (last visited Nov. 19, 2009) (follow "Data" hyperlink under "Defined
Benefit Plans" section).
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Illinois Teachers

6/30/2006

8.5

62

Illinois Universities
Indiana PERF

6/30/2006
6/30/2006

8.5
7.2

65.4
97.6

Indiana Teachers

6/30/2006

7.5

44.3

Iowa PERS
Kansas PERS

6/30/2006
12/31/2006

7.5
8

88.4
69

Kentucky County

6/30/2006

7.7

81.4

Kentucky ERS

6/30/2006

7.7

61.3

Kentucky Teachers

6/30/2006

7.5

73.1

Louisiana SERS

6/30/2006

8.2

64.3

Louisiana Teachers

6/30/2006

8.2

67.5

Maine Local

6/30/2006

7.7

112.2

Maine State and Teacher

6/30/2006

7.7

71.3

Maryland PERS

6/30/2006

7.7

80.4

Maryland Teachers

6/30/2006

7.7

84.2

Massachusetts SERS

1/1/2007

8.2

85.1

Massachusetts Teachers

1/1/2007

8.2

71

Michigan Municipal

12/31/2006

8

76.4

Michigan Public Schools

9/30/2006

8

87.5

Michigan SERS

9/30/2006

8

85.1

Minnesota PERF
Minnesota State Employees

7/1/2006
7/1/2006

8.5
8.5

74.7
96.2

Minnesota Teachers

7/1/2006

8.5

92.1

Mississippi PERS
Missouri DOT and Highway
Patrol

6/30/2006

8

73.5

6/30/2006

8.2

55.5

Missouri Local

2/28/2006

7.5

95.3

Missouri PEERS

6/30/2006

8

80.5

Missouri State Employees
Missouri Teachers

6/30/2006
6/30/2006

8.5
8

85.3
82.6

Montana PERS

6/30/2006

8

88.3

Montana Teachers
Nebraska Schools
Nevada Police Officer and
Firefighter

7/1/2006
7/1/2006

7.7
8

76.1
87.2

6/30/2006

8

68.9

Nevada Regular Employees

6/30/2006

8

76.5

New Hampshire Retirement

6/30/2006

8.5

61.4
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System
New Jersey PERS
New Jersey Police & Fire

7/1/2006
7/1/2006

8.2
8.2

78
78.4

New Jersey Teachers

6/30/2006

8.2

78

New Mexico PERF

6/30/2006

8

92.1

New Mexico Teachers

6/1/2006

8

68.3

New York State Teachers
North Carolina Local
Government
North Carolina Teachers
and State Employees

6/30/2006

8

100

12/31/2006

7.2

99.5

12/31/2006

7.2

106.1

North Dakota PERS

7/1/2006

8

88.8

North Dakota Teachers

7/1/2006

8

75.4

NY State & Local ERS
NY State & Local Police &
Fire

3/31/2006

8

100

3/31/2006

8

100

Ohio PERS
Ohio Police & Fire

12/31/2006
1/1/2007

8
8.2

93
78.2

Ohio School Employees

6/30/2006

8

75.6

Ohio Teachers

7/1/2006

8

75

Oklahoma PERS

7/1/2006

7.5

71.4

Oklahoma Teachers

6/30/2006

8

49.3

Oregon PERS
Pennsylvania School
Employees
Pennsylvania State ERS

12/31/2006

8

110.5

6/30/2006
12/31/2006

8.5
8.5

81.2
92.7

Rhode Island ERS

6/30/2006

n/a*

53.4

Rhode Island Municipal

6/30/2006

n/a*

87.125

South Carolina Police

7/1/2006

7.2

84.7

South Carolina RS

7/1/2006

7.2

69.6

South Dakota PERS

6/30/2006

7.7

96.7

Texas County & District

12/31/2006

8

110.2

Texas ERS

8/31/2006

8

95.2

Texas LECOS

8/31/2006

8

101.7

Texas Municipal

12/31/2006

7

82.1

Texas Teachers

8/31/2006

8

87.3

TN Political Subdivisions

7/1/2005

n/a*

92.672

TN State and Teachers

7/1/2005

na*

99.832
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University of California

7/1/2006

7.5

104.1

Utah Noncontributory

1/1/2005

8

96.4

Vermont State Employees

6/30/2006

8

99.3

Vermont Teachers

6/30/2006

8.2

84.6

Virginia Retirement System

6/30/2006

7.5

80.8

Washington LEOFF Plan 1

9/30/2006

8

116

Washington LEOFF Plan 2

9/30/2006

8

100

Washington PERS 1

9/30/2006

8

73

Washington PERS 2/3
Washington School
Employees Plan 2/3

9/30/2006

8

100

9/30/2006

8

100

Washington Teachers Plan 1
Washington Teachers Plan
2/3

9/30/2006

8

80

9/30/2006

8

100

West Virginia PERS

7/1/2006

7.5

86.8

West Virginia Teachers
Wisconsin Retirement
System

7/1/2006

7.5

31.6

12/31/2006

7.8

99.6

Wyoming Public Employees

1/1/2007

8

94.4

*Data not available

